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Abstract: 
 
 
Arab Uprisings had many aspects that previous demonstrations and protest did not 
experience such as large influence of social media and therefore it is very essential to 
analyze how did civil society impact on the Arab Spring Revolutions in different 
countries and why is the corresponding conflict in Syria on going. Theories of civil 
society and social movements are used to examine the events and argue whether 
these theories are still relevant with all these new aspects. This thesis finds out that 
there are many similar factors and historical background for the uprisings. The main 
cause of the events is economic grievances caused by actions taken by the regimes in 
each respective country and also the lack of social justice. Nevertheless each country 
has its own special differences. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Arab uprising began 18th December 2010 in Tunisia and quickly spread 
throughout the rest of the Middle East in countries such as Egypt, Libya and Syria. 
For decades the people of the Middle East experienced social injustice and felt 
deprived by its leaders and governments but now the time had come to revolt. The 
leaders had ruled these countries with iron fists without consideration to its citizens. 
In spheres such as the economy the people had been feeling this inequality and this 
gave rise to civil society and social movements, which were essential for these 
uprisings. Organisations such as labour unions and Islamist movements appeared and 
attracted more and more followers. This study is about how civil society impacted on 
the Arab Spring and why the struggle in Syria is still taking place and its main focus 
will be the uprisings of 2011. Furthermore, this research is very significant as 
historical changes are taking place in countries, which has suffered for decades and 
now this is transforming. The changes are still occurring and for some have already 
succeeded and therefore, it is significant to establish how and why as this might 
occur in other nations eventually.   
Problem Formulation 
 
How did civil society impact on the Arab Spring Revolutions in Egypt, Libya and 
Tunisia and why is the corresponding conflict in Syria on going? 
Aims 	  -­‐ Identify the role of civil society and social movements in the   
Arab uprisings.  -­‐	   Identify the main contributors to the Arab spring.  -­‐	   Assess the political situations in each country.  -­‐	   Identify differences and similarities in the four countries.  -­‐	   Assess the outcome of the uprisings. 
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Objectives  	  -­‐ Identifying relevant theories and applying them to the case of  
the Arab spring. -­‐ Research the current and past history of the particular  
countries. -­‐	   Explore the modern and past history of politics. -­‐	   After researching differences and similarities, then a parallel  
            between the four states. -­‐ Comparison of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria before and    
after the revolt.  
Terminology 
  
According to this thesis civil society is what happens previous of social movements, 
and is a body objective of family and state, which appeals to people who have mutual 
interests and possibly leads to social movements that consists of group actions that 
carry out, dispute or undo social transformations. However, other key words, which 
are frequently used in this assignment, are: uprising, revolution and civil war. 
Revolutions are divided into three categories by the French political thinker Alexis 
de Tocqueville. The first is political revolutions, which cause changes in the political 
system and institutions but leave other parts of society relatively untouched. The 
second is revolutions that happen suddenly and violently and their aim is to have a 
changing impact on the whole of society. The third definition includes revolutions 
that occur slowly over the years and with several generations. (Boesche, 2006: 86-
87). Oxford Online Dictionary defines uprisings as an act of rebellion or resistance 
and in this study the term uprising is used more frequently than revolution. This is 
because revolution can be seen happening in Libya but not in Tunisia or Egypt 
according to Tocqueville’s first definition of revolution. On the other hand, terms 
such as "youth revolution" and "social media revolution" are argued by some to be 
suitable titles. However, this assignment argues that the social media was a tool used 
in succeeding with the uprisings while the youth joined as supporters of social 
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injustice. In Syria the situation can be defined, as a civil war as well in Libya before 
the regimes was defeated. Civil war is defined as a conflict that is territorially 
enclosed and occurs in areas of internationally recognized states. The state is one of 
the actors and a rebel group is the other force taking part. “The rebel group 
necessarily has some means of financing and opportunity through which it can 
substantively challenge the government, but rebels are unified under defined 
leadership and shared objectives for political control rather than just desire for 
resources or economic exploitation.” (Bhardwaj 2012: 78-81). For example this can 
be seen in the case of the Libyan National Transitional Council (2011-2012), which 
was formed when anti-Gaddafi forces united with the same political goal in mind. 
The situation in Libya and Syria can be seen judged as a civil war, which was 
initiated from an attempt to have a revolution. The term Arab Spring is perhaps the 
most widely used term in this thesis. Spring describes the awakening of the nature, 
and at the same time, the awakening of human awareness. The terms revolution and 
civil war can only be used to describe the situation in Libya and Syria but in the 
cases of all the four countries, it is safer to refer the events of 2011 as Arab Uprisings. 
Methodology 
 
This thesis began with the intention to find out, how much civil-society had an 
impact on the Arab uprisings of 2011 in Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Tunisia. The intent 
was as well to gain further understanding on why the uprisings had been successful 
in overthrowing the state regimes except in Syria. As the events are fairly recent or 
on going, the literature in the field is fairly new and does not always agree on the 
importance of certain factors. The process in selecting which literature to use and 
which pieces were most important to the research was a difficult one for this reason. 
Selection of which theoretical framework to use in the analysis also had to be made. 
As much of the theory often deals with mostly Western circumstances, it was 
necessary to be careful in making sure that the theory could be adapted to the 
circumstances presented by each state. In this chapter, the attempt is to communicate 
with the research methods. 
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Throughout this thesis, the methodology that has been used has been largely 
interpretative, with focus on trying to understand the uprisings from different 
perspectives. The uprisings are presented within each state as a case study for 
comparison. The reason for each choice is to get a variety of uprisings in the Arab 
world, with the three “most successful” uprisings of Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia, and 
the on-going conflict in Syria. Journal articles and reports from different sources on 
the subject were studied in order to cover a wide field of approaches. Then 
interpretations of the information were made through the theoretical framework of 
both social movement theory and theories on civil society. Through this the attempt 
was to get a grasp of the many nuances and sides of the events, which transpired in 
each state.  
 
The different case studies were chosen through the diversity in their experience of 
the uprisings. Libya could be considered as being the most military based uprising. 
Tunisia can be seen as the relatively peaceful beginning, with the lowest number of 
deaths and injuries. Egypt would be considered a middle stage between the three, 
where the military intervened in favour of the protesters. Syria is a special case unto 
itself where the uprisings have resulted in a two yearlong conflict. By researching 
this spectrum of uprisings in the area, the hope was to gain an understanding of the 
fundamental elements involved in the uprisings. 
 
For each nation a number of journal articles were collected and other sources on the 
subject of the uprisings, which occurred in each respective nation. Any information 
that was found on how the protests were organized, who/what was behind the 
mobilization of the populace, and which networks and connections were integral to 
the success of the uprisings was thoroughly examined. Most of the sources consist of 
academic journal articles found online as well as certain books recently released on 
the subject. Then interpretations of these sources were made through the theoretical 
framework provided in chapter one. Each state is examined in trying to see how built 
up civil society was, who the political actors were, how the movements have formed, 
and what factors accounted for their success. The collective information was taken 
and attempted to find the fundamental elements, which characterize these uprisings. 
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It is from that comparison the hope of getting an understanding of the overall nature 
of these cases comes and thus be able to answer the research question. 
Structure 
 
This thesis is divided into three chapters. Chapter one begins with an introduction to 
the various conceptions of civil society. Both the early definitions and present 
interpretations are presented and the thoughts of political philosophers such as Hegel 
and Tocqueville are given attention. As to be seen, what combines all of these 
conceptions is the thought of civil society being an "arena" outside the states control. 
Civil society is seen as a collective action practised by the citizens and as a relevant 
part of functioning democracy. It is an arena where citizen’s opinions are formulated 
and then conveyed to the regime. The last part of chapter one focuses on social 
movements and the diverse theories given. Social movements can be seen as a 
relatively new field of study academically and the relevance of examining them has 
increased in recent years. The Arab Uprisings function as an exquisite example of 
this relevance. The areas of social movement theory that are presented include 
resource mobilization theory, the political process/opportunities model and relative 
deprivation theory.  
In chapter two the cases of the four countries are presented. The focus begins in 
Tunisia and moves on to Egypt and Libya and ends in Syria. The order is determined 
by the chronological order of the events. The separate narration of each country is 
reasoned since all of the countries have their own, unique characteristics, which are 
worth given special attention to. In this chapter the aim is to specify the details of the 
occurrences country by country and implement the theories presented in chapter one. 
The information stated in chapter two is later taken into wider consideration as a tool 
for the analysis in chapter three.  
In chapter three comparisons are made between the countries and the role of civil 
society and social movements in the uprisings are examined more profoundly. 
Categories of the factors that launched the uprisings are given. These classifications 
include authoritarian states and democracy, social media, Islamist movements, bread 
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riots, unemployment, labour unions and tribes. The categories are made to facilitate 
the interpretation and comparison. In the end, the outcomes of the uprisings are 
clarified. 
Literature Review 
 
This assignment uses mostly secondary sources and most of the sources have been 
published during the last few years, as these events are very recent. References 
include materials from Mandatory Course II: Globalisation, Political Culture, Civil 
Society and Social Movements and also academic articles from different publications, 
such as The Journal of North African Studies, Vol. 16 (4) which entirely focuses on 
the particular events in the Middle East and North Africa. The literature was chosen 
together with the supervisor of this thesis, Sune Haugbølle and literature is very 
corresponding to our needs and therefore, it provided perspective and various points 
of views.  
As first chapter is based on civil society and social movement theory, it mainly 
concentrates on Robin Cohen and Paul Kennedy (2007) Global Sociology and works 
of different scholars who have discussed these theories. The main reference used in 
the second chapter is The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New 
Middle East (2011) by Marc Lynch. This book was chosen because it is very 
appropriate in the case of explaining the Arab Uprisings as it describes the situation 
in these countries before and after the uprisings and this is very relevant when 
writing this thesis. Third chapter analyses and compares all different cases presented 
in the second chapter and therefore, this assignment finds Roel Meijer’s Taking the 
Islamist Movement Seriously: Social Movement Theory and the Islamist Movement 
(2005) to be very relevant.  
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1. CIVIL SOCIETY AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT 
THEORIES 
 
Civil society and social movements have existed for many years but it has also 
transformed through time. It has been the centre for much debate and many diverse 
theorists such as Huricihan İslamoğlu (2001) within civil society and Anthony 
Giddens (1991) on social movements have discussed these spheres. This assignment 
will explore the many definitions and theories by discussing and comparing them to 
one another. Furthermore, this thesis will also examine the theory of relative 
deprivation. 
1.1 Civil Society Theories 
 
Huricihan İslamoğlu argues in Civil Society, Concept and History of (2001) that civil 
society is coterminous with the state as its power relations are ordered through law 
and institutions with the goal of ensuring social harmony… second, civil society is a 
self-regulating, self-governing body outside and often in opposite to the state, 
representing both as the nexus of societal associations expected to generate civility, 
social cohesion and morality, and as the site of reciprocal economic relations among 
individuals engaged in market exchange activity (İslamoğlu, 2001:1891). Here 
İslamoğlu defines civil society as both a political tool but also a phenomena which 
exists outside the state however, eighteenth century German philosopher Georg 
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel “…no longer used it as a synonym for political society, but 
defined it on the other hand as distinct from the family, and on the other (and most 
crucially) from the state.” (Khilnani, 2001:23).  
 
These are two distinct definitions of civil society but they both refer civil society to 
be separate from the state even though, there is about several hundred years between 
them. İslamoğlu believes the government to have some power concerning civil 
society in regards to laws and social norms. This is to a certain extent true but 
sometimes- civil society does not consider the laws and norms important, or in other 
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cases finds the laws and norms to be immoral and unjust, and therefore break them to 
get their message and actions through. This also demonstrates that according to 
Hegel and İslamoğlu state and civil society are separate organs.  This assignment 
believes that currently civil society is mostly considered political, especially due to 
its association with democracy. However, bodies such as sport clubs can be neutral 
as their interests are mainly outside the political sphere. Civil society aspires to 
uphold an influence and spread their objectives within the state and society, such as 
environmental organizations. Their engagement is essential in the political sphere as 
policies, resolutions and laws will have an impact on these organizations and they 
will operate thereafter and hence, it can be argued that they are political. In 
democratic states, the government is often a reflection of the population, however in 
non-democratic states civil society is essential in diverse ways as they have different 
goals and objectives to promote its peoples’ interests on a political scale by actions 
affecting the government. Civil society have different characteristics in non-
democratic states as in democratic ones and these will be discussed later but it can be 
argued that a forceful civil society in states such as oppressive ones are even more 
significant. Robin Cohen and Paul Kennedy argue this as well in Global Sociology 
(2007) by saying civil society ”… are engaged in expressing their members’ interests 
and trying to shape national political culture...” (Cohen and Kennedy, 2007:71). 
 
Historically civil society has changed trough time, but the modern perception 
emerged in the eighteenth century. It originates in the revolutionary period as terms 
such as liberty and free speech were developing. There are disputes about when these 
changes occurred, but Steven M. Buechler claims that in the 1970s and 1980s civil 
society became based on cultural orientation instead of class. Furthermore, he argues 
this change meant that the personal became the political (1995:452). Buechler’s 
argument is acceptable one the fact that movements nowadays are founded on 
collective identity such as gender, sexuality or ethnicity and this thesis believes this 
to be due to globalization. Moreover, Sidney Tarrow argues that “…many new social 
movements aren’t really all that new, because they often have grown out of pre-
existing organizations and have long histories that are obscured by new social 
movement discourse.” (1995:447). Both arguments contain measures of truth but 
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nevertheless, the world is getting more globalized, and civil society has converted 
into a cultural association as cultural clashes are occurring due to globalization. 
History is also an essential part as many social groups have backgrounds and Tarrow 
is correct in arguing that these movements have changed, but this development is 
based on cultural terms and globalization such as Buechler and this project are 
arguing.  
 
For some many theorists the 1990s holds great importance for civil society and 
Kadambari Anantram, Christopher Chase-Dunn and Ellen Reese (2010) believe that 
“In the 1990s, civil society became the new buzzword. The global trend towards 
democracy opened up space for 'civil society' in erstwhile dictatorial nations” 
(Anantram, Chase-Dunn and Reese, 2010:605). In the late 1980s communism 
gradually deteriorated in Eastern Europe and therefore, opening up for the ideas of 
civil society and that is why Anantram et al. believes the 1990s to be an essential 
period for civil society as it became more flourishing then ever in this region and 
more known in others. Different authors focus on civil society in various parts of the 
world and hence, the history of civil society differs. As argued previously, the 1970s 
and 1980s changed the base of civil society in the majority of the Western world but 
in the communist dominated regions the history of civil society is more complicated. 
This thesis argues that civil society in these territories did not flourish until the 1990s 
and is why particular theorists find this period crucial. During this era globalization 
became an important feature and civil society was able to use this to make local 
issues transnational. Paffenholz and Spurk discuss that during this period the NGOs 
worldwide increased their activity and so did the third sector - it started to operate 
outside the state and market (Paffenholz and Spurk, 2006:6).  This hypothesis argues 
that globalization was essential for this development as the state did not have the 
capacity to contain civil society due to globalization and that is why NGOs and the 
third sector became so prominent. Definitions and the history of civil society have 
been discussed but it also significant to look into the many diverse theories of this 
fascinating phenomenon.  
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Much has been written on civil society and there have been many dissimilar 
theoretical views through time. One of these is the Frenchman Alexander de 
Tocqueville (1805-1958) who “…stressed…the role of these independent 
associations as civil society…He saw these associations as schools of democracy in 
which democratic thinking, attitudes and behaviour are learned, also with the aim to 
protect and defend individual rights against potentially authoritarian regimes and 
tyrannical majorities in society.” (Paffenholz and Spurk, 2006:4). It is clear that 
Tocqueville’s view has its roots and inspiration in the revolutionary period, where 
democracy and the rights of the people were highly valued. Tocqueville associates 
civil society with democracy as many present and previous theorists do/did such as 
Sudipta Kaviraj and Sunil Khilnani in their book Civil Society: History and 
Possibilities (2001). Today democracy is considered to be the most rational and best 
method for a state to operate and that is why civil society is often related with 
democracy as it represents every individual in a society in one way or another and 
this view as argues transpired during the French Revolution (1789-1799) and 
American War of Independence (1775-1983).  
 
Another contradictory, but later theorist is Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937) who 
focused on the economic aspects of civil society. He viewed civil society as 
“between the economic structure and the state” (Gramsci 1971:448) such as 
individuals, family and media being economically driven and relating democracy as 
many including this assignment would argue. This assignment believes this to be 
incorrect, as democracy does not necessarily mean high economic status for most, 
but a better positioned political status as one can vote and achieve political 
significance by having a say. 
 
Hannah Arendt (1906-1975) believed ”The term “public” signified two closely 
interrelated phenomena’s: first everything that appears in public can be seen and 
heard by everybody and has the widest possible publicity. … Second, the term 
signifies the world itself, in so far as it is common to all of us and distinguished from 
our privately owned place in it” (Arendt 1958: 50-52). Democracy and civil society 
can only exist if they are public, in order to survive they both need the people/the 
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public and that is why Arendt’s theory is relevant in explaining civil society. To be 
able to live together, citizens need to create society together and this can be only 
done publicly and collectively. All this occurs in public and not in the private sphere 
otherwise it is not civil society. Another reason why this needs to take place publicly 
is argued by a more modern theorist Jürgen Habermas (1929). He insists that “the 
political system needs the articulation of interests in the public space to put different 
concerns on the political agenda, but this function cannot be left entirely to 
established institutions such as political parties. Marginalized groups in particular 
need to organize and a find a way to articulate their interests. This is necessary 
because political parties and parliaments need to get informed public opinion beyond 
the established power structures” (Paffenholz and Spurk, 2006: 4). Habermas’ view 
also connects civil society with democracy as this project but what makes his thesis 
different from the many other theorists is his belief that parliaments and political 
organizations necessitates civil society to subsist. If civil society would exist in a 
democratic state this view would apply perfectly as state and society would support 
each other and the two would make sure none would violate any laws, norms or take 
advantage of its power. It would also mean there would be some kind of cooperation 
between the two and many individuals and organizations would be heard and 
represented. Habermas’ theory would have a difficult time surviving in totalitarian 
state where civil society and government would be fighting each other on all fronts 
and often a civil society would not even exists or be concealed in these cultures, 
which could have a limiting effect on their power however, this is not always the 
case and civil society would maybe have the power to shift to democracy. Moreover, 
for civil society to live in these kinds of societies is of great significance and they 
depend on it to remove their totalitarian state. Famous writer and scientist Francis 
Fukuyama (1952) argues very differently from Beermats as he focuses on social 
capital but they both put parallels between civil society and democracy. For 
Fukuyama social capital is what causes civil society and is what endorses 
collaboration between two or more individuals and maybe later the cooperation can 
develop into an organization or group. “Civil society…has been almost universally 
seen as a necessary condition for modern liberal democracy…If a democracy is in 
fact liberal, it maintains a protected sphere of individual liberty where the state is 
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constrained from interfering…Civil society serves to balance the power of the state 
and to protect individuals from the state's power.” (Fukuyama, 2000: 7). Here 
Fukuyama argues the same as Habermas but in a diverse way. Habermas do not 
make a distinction between where civil society exists but as argued this assignment 
believes civil society thrives best in a democratic state and Fukuyama claims that if 
civil society exists it usually is in a representative state. Furthermore, he discusses 
that the government must not influence civil society and this is essential as civil 
society is considered to be the opposite of the state but also representing members 
outside the state according to Cohen and Kennedy (2007). This cannot be done if the 
government is implementing and regulating civil society to its own advantage and 
then it cannot function properly and the state cannot be considered democratic. 
Democracy really began to take a whole new meaning in the 1960s where social 
movements began change.  
1.2 Social Movement Theories 
 
The growing middle class of the 1960s and new emerged occupations raised new 
social demands. This allowed the post-industrial social movements to develop. 
Technology and education raised awareness of problematic issues in the political 
sphere and citizens were no longer willing to be left out from the decision making 
process: those who are often affected the most by the objectives of social movements 
are the educated ones who are unable to tolerate the exclusion from power. The 
background of social movement (SM) is in anti materialism and giving the power 
back to the people. (Cohen and Kennedy, 2007: 338-340). 
 
Throughout the period of modernity social movements were primarily concerned 
with what Anthony Giddens (1938) calls 'emancipatory politics' meaning that they 
were struggling to gain freedom from structures and inequalities, which restricted 
personal freedom and their life. (Giddens, 1991: 210). These include movements 
such as universal suffrage, the abolition of slavery, etc. Social movements were 
primarily focused on gaining some level of direct control over the state. 
 
 16 
Contemporary social movements have much less interest in directly controlling or 
accessing state power. The focus of social movements moved towards what Giddens 
calls 'life politics' meaning that it focuses more on what to do with said emancipatory 
rights once they have been gained. “…it is a politics of choice…While emancipatory 
politics is a politics of life chances, life politics  is a politics of lifestyle.” (Giddens, 
1991: 214).  
 
Social movements are a response to social changes. They appear as a manifest of 
popular sentiments. Several different definitions of social movements exist. For 
example John Wilson claims in his 1973 book Introduction to Social Movements that 
“…a social movement is a conscious, collective, organized attempt to bring about or 
resist large-scale change in the social order by non-institutionalized means.” (Wilson, 
1973: 8). However, Paul Byrne defines social movements as unpredictable, irrational, 
unreasonable and disorganized (Byrne, 1997: 10-11). These are two very different 
definitions and it can be argues that both are right as it depends on which groups one 
focuses on. Cyrus Zirakzadeh defines a social movement as a group of people of 
various social backgrounds who attempt to build a new social order through the use 
of confrontational and disruptive tactics. (Cohen and Kennedy, 2007: 437). This 
discrepancy in definitions can be accounted for due to the varied tactics needed in 
different situations. Whereas in some areas an organized movement can be effective, 
in others movements will be reactionary and spontaneous. For example, certain 
movements will have large organizations supporting them such as Greenpeace or 
PETA whereas others may appear as a spontaneous reaction to specific events and 
thus might not have the support of established organizations.  
 
Social movements do not necessarily appear in areas where there is the greatest need 
for them. For example, in fragile states where there is a need for social movements 
action might be restricted either by the state or by the lack of the necessary societal 
networks needed for mobilization as discussed previously within civil society. 
Western democracies have in most cases very active social movements in 
comparison with other nations that do not enjoy the same standard of living and 
political freedoms (Wiktorowicz, 2003: 9).  
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Social movements have typically had two main aspects and characteristics while 
organizing and having a demonstration: first of all they try to have an impact on the 
power holders and indicate their grievances. Secondly social movements try to 
display their goals to the general public in order to gain more members and support. 
In some occasions the impacts of social movements are indirect and can even be 
partly contradictory to their original goals. (Giugni, 1998: 379-386). In the case of 
Arab uprisings we feel that the revolutionary action was greatly collective and had its 
roots on the well displayed and powerfully conveyed complaints, which attracted 
people to join. 
 
Resource mobilization theory (RMT) sees social movements as being rational and 
organized. Its central point being that while individual grievances are omnipresent 
social movements are not and therefore, there must be an organized process where 
individual or collective grievances transform into social movements. RMT's 
understandings appeared as a contradictory response to the earlier conceptions of 
social movements, which originated in functionalist social psychology’s views of 
mass behaviour. The earlier comprehensions concentrated on the structural and 
psychological causes of mass mobilization: social movements were seen as a cause 
of psychological discomfort and as a way to response to changing conditions and 
structural pressure with collective action (Wiktorowicz, 2003: 6-10). RMT has 
dominated the study of social movements recently and that is why the study has paid 
a great attention to the organizational character of social movements (Giugni 1998: 
374-375.) Resource mobilization theory emphasizes the role of leadership and takes 
in consideration practical theorists. RMT also stresses the importance of tactical 
action and studies the connections between social movements and other groups. 
(McCarthy and Zald, 1977: 1213). In the case of Arab uprisings we feel that this kind 
of approach is vital due to the massive impact the revolutionary action had in these 
countries and the dramatic societal changes it brought with it. Properly organized 
demonstrations also require a successful leadership skills and the ability to assert the 
goals clearly to the general public.  
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RMT has traditionally underlined the importance of informal organizations and 
networks. Especially social networks are seen as a tool to recruit new members and 
spread the values around the society. These kind of informal ways of action pay an 
important role in countries where freedom of expression is somehow restricted and 
where formal models of activism might be the targets of government repression. In 
such societies the regime may not the informal institutions and social networks 
seriously as a threat to their existence (Wiktorowicz, 2003: 12-13). This was the case 
for example in Libya where the Gaddafi lead regime realized the power of Internet in 
a relatively late phase. In the Arab uprisings social networks and media information 
had a key role in organizing the demonstrations and informing people of what was 
about to occur which makes the use of resource mobilization theory in our 
assignment reasoned.   
 
Political process model of social movements appeared as a criticism to RMT. While 
there have been relatively few studies into this model, David S. Meyer gives a good 
analysis of this model. He puts forth that there are two models, a structural model 
and a signal model. The structural model according to him covers "…variables that 
track formal changes in rules and policies affecting political access, as well as the 
changed practices that follow from them." (Meyer and Minkoff, 2004: 1467-1468). 
On the other hand, the signalling model states "…activists and officials monitor 
changes in the political environment, looking for encouragement for mobilization 
and for advocating policy reforms." (Meyer and Minkoff, 2004: 1470). The 
advantage of the political process model is that it can account both for general factors 
common to the cases we will examine and case-specific factors, which might have 
influenced the uprisings. Through this, we might be able to see what political factors 
have helped in the mobilization of civil society in each respective case. This may 
then give us the opportunity to see what the uprisings both have in common and 
where they significantly deviate from each other. 
 
Both of these concepts are taken into consideration as each theory has its pros and 
cons. RMT is useful because of its focus on organizational resources as opposed to 
singular events or grievances. In this case, it would help in gaining understanding of 
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how civil society has helped in organizing and giving resources to the social 
movements responsible for the Arab uprisings. On the other hand the uprisings were 
greatly about mass mobilization and collective action. People were motivated by the 
common discomfort derived from problems seen in the society. While there may 
have been a core group of activists putting together the resources needed for 
mobilization, the vast majority may have reacted to singular events, which served as 
a catalyst for the uprisings, such as the death of Mohamed Bouazizi (1984-2011) in 
Tunisia. Therefore it is important to look as well at these uprisings from a social 
psychology viewpoint so as to understand why those events had the effect that they 
did. In addition, the political process model may give us insight into how the political 
climate helped in bringing about these uprisings and perhaps give us specifics on 
why they occurred when they did. By analysing the uprisings through these different 
models we hope to get a well-rounded view of how and why they occurred. 
 
Definitions and theories of civil society and social movements have now been 
examined and discussed and therefore, it is important to explore the linkage between 
the two. It can be argued that the relationship between social movements and civil 
society is a fairly intimate one. They seem to have a positive effect on the build-up of 
the other, with civil society helping to provide the initial networks needed for base 
social movement organization. In Cohen and Kennedy (2007) SM’s are being 
described as the key agents for progressive and humanitarian social change (Cohen 
and Kennedy, 2007: 544). SM’s consists of group actions that carry out, dispute or 
undo social transformations while civil society occurs before this, as it is an 
institution separate of the family and state, which attracts people who have mutual 
interests and maybe later lead to social movements. “Civil society initiatives and 
social movements are social processes which undergo several stages of progression 
from mobilization to intensive collective action.” (Sociology Guide, 2011) However, 
one significant feature, which these phenomena’s have in common, is their need for 
change in society and their dependence on each other. Moreover, in RMT as 
discussed before, it can be argued that the ‘individual or collective grievances’ are 
civil society and then it converts into SM’s. One more feature, which they have in 
common, is the Theory of Relative Deprivation, which will be discussed next. Debra 
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Minkoff (1997) puts forth that national social movement organizations have four 
beneficial effects on civil society: 
 
First, they provide trace evidence of denser social networks and social 
infrastructures of the sort applauded by analysts of civil society. Second, 
the expansion of the national movement sector contributes to an enduring 
opportunity structure for activism by marginalized groups. Third, 
national SMOs serve a critical linkage function for movements with 
"weak infrastructures" and have the potential to promote the diffusion of 
collective identities, providing at least a minimal degree of solidarity and 
integration for otherwise isolated members of society. Fourth, national 
SMOs promote public discourse and debate, strengthening the public 
sphere and the formation of counterpublics. (Minkoff, 1997: 607) 
The hypothesize is that it is possible to see in each case a dual effect, of civil society 
affecting social movement organizations and vice-versa. It will however be 
interesting to see in each case, which effect is the dominant one as the relation 
between civil society and the social movements involved in the uprisings will most 
likely be different on a country-to-country basis. This will help in determining the 
role of civil society in the Arab uprisings and to what extent it aided in the creation 
of social movements in each respective nation. 
 
The hope is that through the use of these different approaches to social movement 
theory and the possible interaction between civil society and social movements that it 
is possible to get a comprehensive view over the proceedings of the Arab uprisings. 
The goal to see which approaches are most relevant in gaining and understanding of 
the events, which occurred (and are occurring) in each of nations in this study. The 
aim is that this will give a better understanding of how different societal and political 
factors affected the process involved. 
  
Relative Deprivation Theory (RDT) has been the centre of much debate in many 
years and its history goes far back. Mostly theorist agree in general terms of what 
RDT means however, there are many diverse associations and distinctions. 
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Deprivation derives from comparisons made in people’s minds. The main focus in 
RDT is on situations where people feel that their right to certain goods and 
conditions is barred. This causes willingness to remedy the situation. RDT is divided 
into personally and group felt derivation: the first one occurs when comparisons are 
made interpersonally, while the group aspect is felt when comparing groups with 
each other. However, the distinction between these two aspects cannot be made too 
strictly (Walken and Wong, 2002: 288-299). If applying this view of RDT to the 
Arab Uprisings in the Middle East, the situation was felling radically unjustified by 
the citizens, which caused the action and demonstrations in order to remedy the 
situation and stop the repression of the totalitarian state they were residing in. It is 
clear that there had been certain comparisons made which caused the peoples 
awareness of the situation in the Arab societies. Since the uprisings were a successful 
collective action, it can be argued that the comparisons made were mostly based on 
group comparisons. It is also significant to argue that these groups felt that they had a 
right in every way to take violent action to achieve their goal. A different definition 
and view is that RDT typically declares social and temporal comparisons as central 
components in evaluating whether one is deprived. Its main focuses are feelings, 
behaviour and actions. Simone Flynn states in Theories of Social Movements (2011) 
that Tocqueville and Marx, in the nineteenth century, used the idea of relative 
deprivation in their respective analyses of The French Revolution and the problems 
associated with the rise of capitalism and personal property (Flynn, 2011: 105) and 
this is the same with the Arab spring discussed above and it can be argued that RDT 
is often associated with revolt and revolutions. Further, this demonstrates clearly that 
social movements originate from open and democratic societies and that is where 
they tend to be most successful. However, they can also arise in totalitarian states 
such as with the evidence of the Arab spring. They used group action to relieve this 
feeling of deprivation but SM’s in democratic states had most likely inspired them. 
“...feelings of deprivation over power, money or status may lead individuals and 
groups to create social movements and social change.” (Flynn, 2011: 102).  
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2. UPRISINGS IN TUNISIA, EGYPT, LIBYA AND SYRIA 
Each of the four countries has their own unique telling of the Arab Uprisings but on 
the other hand they are very similar. This chapter will be examining all four 
countries’ role in the Arab Uprisings by clarifying its historical background that lead 
to the uprisings. Furthermore this chapter will also focus on the diversity during the 
uprisings and implementing social movement theories. 
2.1 Tunisia  
 
Tunisian society has experienced a number of uprisings, social and political protests 
during its modern history (Mabrouk, 2011: 626). In 1978 there were demonstrations, 
which were organized by UGTT (Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens, 
General Union of Tunisian Workers) to protest against worsening financial crisis in 
Tunisia. Many demonstrators were killed and injured, including UGTT leader Habib 
Achour. It was followed by the bread riots in 1984, which were held because the 
price of bread and other staples were increasing almost double. Both these riots in 
Tunisia’s recent history can be considered according to Adib Nehme “…uprisings of 
civil society against statist regimes” (Nehme, 2011). Few years after this, on the 7th 
November 1987 Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, then prime minister of Tunisia, announced 
that a team of doctors had declared Habib Bourguiba mentally unfit to govern and 
that, as the recently appointed prime minister, he was assuming power. He promised 
Tunisian economy to flourish and the country to move towards democracy. He 
organized the country’s first multi-candidate election in 1999, which he won with a 
farcical 99,44% of the vote. This earned him the nickname Mr 99%, although he was 
also knows as Ben A Vie (president for life) (Legg, 2011). When people realize that 
things do not change when they need to, they start to demonstrate, but neither of 
these previous demonstrations turned out like the one on 2011, which the world 
knows as Jasmine Revolution and which was the root of the Arab Uprising. On the 
17th December of 2010 twenty-six year old Mohamed Bouazazi was illegally selling 
fruits and vegetables on the streets of Sidi Bouzid, he lights himself to fire as police 
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comes to stop him. In the beginning it seemed just an ordinary incident just like 
many others in the streets of Tunisia or the other Middle Eastern countries, but this 
time it was different. It turned out that this unknown Tunisian man started the series 
of rebellions against corruption and tyrannical governance. As George Joffé argues 
there were spontaneous demonstrations in sympathy with Mohammed Bouazizi’s 
action taken in hand by local branches of the UGTT, together with representatives of 
lawyer associations and journalists. They organized a series of rolling 
demonstrations around the country, culminating in major demonstrations in the 
capital Tunis, in protest against the regime’s repressive policies since 1991, when it 
had first turned on the country’s Islamist movement, Annahda (Joffé, 2011: 518). 
The question is, how did events develop in Tunisia to lead such a revolution in less 
than a month, in such way that nobody beforehand could have predicated or planned 
for such an outcome (Mabrouk, 2011: 626). 
 
Firstly, the main answer is the new social media and spread of Internet and 
technological developments in the Middle East. The key issue is that contrary to the 
custom media it is very hard for governmental authorities to take over the control of 
social media. Dale F. Eickelman argues in The Middle East’s Democracy Deficit and 
the Expanding Public Sphere (2004) that “Many governments in the Middle East are 
deeply suspicious of an open press, non-governmental organizations, and 
unrestricted expression that the ‘restive’ public, increasingly educated and influenced 
by hard-to-censor new media, can take action.” (Eickelman, 2004:). That is why they 
control as much as possible print media, radio and television. As there is a shortage 
of independent media, dissatisfied youths have searched for alternatives, such as new 
social media, to participate in the public sphere. Many people on the streets filmed 
what happened with Mohamed Bouzazi and posted these videos on YouTube and 
Facebook and tweeted about it in Twitter so the rest of Tunisia and the world would 
know the situation. Therefore it can be said that the social media, the shocking 
pictures and videos were one of the most important part of the uprising. As the 
Tunisian youth was already very angry they kept protesting against what happened in 
Sidi Bouzid, against corruption and political condition. During the protest they had 
their mobile phones with them in order to record everything and post it online right 
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away. “At the point when demonstrations reached the nation’s capital, Tunis, 
protesters had stopped calling for policy changes, and started calling for President 
Ben Ali’s removal. On January 14, Ben Ali absconded to Saudi Arabia. In just under 
a month, the people of Tunisia had successfully brought down their dictator.” 
(Kerson, 2011). Former Tunisian President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali’s dethronement 
showed clearly that collectively minded people have huge power to do important 
things that matter. Never before had people of Tunisia experienced this kind of 
fellow feeling and as the other nations of Middle East were inspired by Tunisia, soon 
the fellow feeling covered whole Middle Eastern and North African region.  
 
Secondly, the reason of the uprising is high unemployment among well-educated 
young people in Tunisia. The reasons according to Mehdi Mabrouk are weak policies 
in higher education: state is making higher education more easily accessible at a time 
when demographic growth generated far greater demand and it encourages two-
thirds of all university students towards literature and the human sciences, 
irrespective of what their future employment opportunities would be (Mabrouk, 
2011: 628). It is clearly the government’s role to organize the education system and 
when it is seen that something is wrong, it has to be changed. Tunisia needs less 
skilled and lower paid industrial workers, therefore the state must change education 
policies in order to educate more employees for these kinds of jobs. As people 
without jobs get stressed, they feel deprived and need a change. They are more likely 
to go out to the streets, even while knowing about the violence they will receive if 
doing so. People lose their fear, they are not afraid and in this kind of situation 
“…death is more attractive than life under such conditions” (Mabrouk, 2011: 629). 
The fact that there were so many jobless educated people in the country might be the 
reason why these events happened. Educated people are more likely to use the 
Internet and therefore they are familiar with the news from the world, such as 
democracy in Western countries. People of Tunisia have not experienced freedom of 
press, speech and expression and as seen from Internet that most of the world had 
these liberties, they started to compare themselves with them and they felt deprived. 
This explains clearly the main focus of Relative Deprivation Theory used previously 
in this assignment: people of Tunisia felt that their right to certain goods and 
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conditions was barred. This caused the action of uprising in order to have democratic 
state. Many say that Western way of thinking and democratic ideology can never be 
spread in Middle Eastern countries. Obviously there are big cultural differences 
between Western world and Middle East, but these differences cannot hold people 
back to make decisions for themselves and live in a country where everyone has 
equal opportunities. On the other hand, stable democracy is based on long experience, 
which Arab countries do not have. Hence, it is hard to say if Arab people understand 
the meaning of human rights and are ready to respect them as they have very long 
history of patriarchal manners. The other aspect we can use to explain Relative 
Deprivation Theory in case of uprising in Tunisia is Ben Ali’s and his relatives' 
luxurious lifestyle. As Tunisian economy was mainly based on industries and 
tourism, it had a huge downfall during the world economic and financial crisis in 
2009. Therefore people of Tunisia did not like to see how their leader was spending 
money as the unemployment rate was increasing and economy was deteriorating. 
Joshua E. Keating is describing in Lifestyles of the Rich and Tyrannical (2011) how 
Ben Ali’s son-in-law was having a massive dinner, including more then dozen dishes 
and frozen yoghurt flown in by plane from Saint-Tropez and yet more he owned a 
pet tiger, which he kept in cage and who consumed four chickens per day (Keating, 
2011).  
 
According to Francesco Cavatorta and Rikke Hostrup Haugbølle (2012) “... of all 
Arab countries, Tunisia was believed to be one of the least likely to experience such 
a massive uprising against a regime that had seemingly obtained a number of notable 
achievements” (Cavatora and Haugbølle, 2012: 182). This is true as Tunisian 
women’s social and legal status differs a lot from the others in the Middle East: they 
are allowed to file for divorce and have a right to vote and therefore Tunisia women 
played an essential role in bringing down the regime. The fact that women came out 
to the streets and protested together with everyone else clearly demonstrates that 
Tunisian society should have already been one step closer to a new democratic era as 
Tunisia is also been “…long considered as the most liberal among the Arab states…” 
(Lynch, 2011). Unfortunately it is not so as Emma Murphy (2012) discusses 
“Islamist tendency has deep roots and historically wider appeal than it is often 
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credited with. Thirty years of fierce repression, and regime discourses that focused 
on violent factions and episodes, combined with the high visibility of secular public 
cultures in the capital, obscured very real significance of Islam for rural populations, 
lower socio-economic strata and formats of opposition activism” (Murphy, 2012). 
With the first free elections after the uprising, Islamist party Ennhada came into 
power. They were criticised about their Islamic views about the role of the women. 
Nevertheless they set up few statements regarding to woman’s right and gender 
equality and as Edit Bauer, a member of European Parliament stated in her interview 
to the European Parliament television, “without equality there will be no democracy 
in the Arab world” (Bauer, 2012). 
2.2 Egypt  
 
Slogans such as the people want to bring down the regime and leave or go are just a 
few of the many chanted by civil society in Egypt during the Arab Uprisings in 2011. 
Egypt was the second country after Tunisia, which revolted against its regime to end 
decades of corruption and torture. For thirty years the country had be harshly ruled 
by president Muhammad Hosni Said Mubarak (1928), who became president without 
a democratic election. Mubarak was forced to step down on 11 February 2011 due to 
the pressure from massive protests in Cairo and other essential cities.  
 
Opposition against the Egyptian rule already began in the 1970s and it is important to 
establish that then and now the antagonism was and is not signally about democracy. 
Furthermore, civil society such as the lower class and social movements such as the 
Labour unions are significant actors in the 2011 uprisings as it was events initiated 
by them within roughly past thirty years, which lay the foundation. In 1977 the 
ground breaking event of the Bread riots occurred and Timothy Mitchell argues 
“…the Egyptian government announced it was accepting the demands of the 
International Monetary Fund…to eliminate food subsidies and doubling the price of 
bread, groups of workers, students, and the urban poor marched to the centre of 
Cairo. The demonstration turned into riots and spread…” (Mitchell, 2002:249). As 
Mitchell argues it were many different groups of civil society and SM’s, which 
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joined hands and opposed the government’s decision to liberalize the economy, as it 
would result in even further poverty and neglect of the people. It can also be argued 
that this was the beginning of an era where people lacked confidence in the Egyptian 
government. Moreover, in February 1986 the violent Egyptian Conscription riots was 
sparked by Mubarak wanting to prolong the Central Security Forces period of 
conscription from three to four years and argued by Hillel Frisch they were 
“…poorly paid and poorly armed…” (Frisch,2001: 6). This assignment believes that 
both these revolts were based on economic grounds and not democratic ones and that 
the riots by the many diverse SM’s and groups of civil society such as the labour 
movements lay the base for the 2011 uprisings. However, in April 2008 protests in 
Mahallah based on economic grounds appeared called the Egyptian General Strike as 
food prices rose and with low wages the workers within the state textile industry 
revolted. Labour activist Kamal Fayoumi states in the article The Labour Movement 
and the Future of Democracy in Egypt (2012) that "Mahallah is the mother of Tahrir. 
On April 6, 2008, they said the whole country was in Mahallah. On January 25, 2011, 
they said everyone was in Tahrir." (LeVine and Eletrebi, 2012). This argument 
underlines the significant influence that previous protests had on the 2011 revolt as 
they inspired and removed the fear barrier gradually. Moreover, it can be argued that 
essential characteristics of all the rebellions were the police brutality against 
protesters and illegitimacy of protesting which caused protesters from many diverse 
backgrounds to join and support each other. Furthermore, this thesis argues that the 
many different claims could only be realized if these movements worked together to 
remove Mubarak. SM’s such as the labour activists from the April 6th Movement, 
Islamists from the Muslim Brotherhood and the Ultras Ahlawy supporters of the 
Egyptian football club Al-Ahly revolted together but it was the privatization of the 
economy throughout the past 30 years by leaders such as Mubarak which was the 
background for the uprisings. 
 
The opposition against the rule in the 1990s was lead mostly by Islamists social 
movements but this assignment argues that it was to a smaller extent. Faoud Ajami 
believes in The Sorrows of Egypt that  “Thus faced with a relentless campaign of 
subversion, the regime responded by showing no mercy. The state apparatus was 
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given green light to root out armed Islamic groups and to do it without the kinds of 
protections and restraints a society of laws and honours expects.” (1995: 77). 
Ajami’s argument describes what occurred in the 1990s and he is reliable. It was 
mostly Islamic groups who opposed Mubarak’s reign but also others and he did 
everything in his power without consideration to the law and the people and 
therefore, the hate against him grew and his influence decreased. In the years 
following the people of Egypt would suffer even further as poverty, unemployment 
and increasing prices would arise and so would the antagonism of the people. In 
2011 Egypt changed forever when the educated youth of Egypt joined hands and 
initiated the uprising. They united on the basis of similar interests such as civil 
society as argued does and created social movements. It can be argued these 
movements were responsible, for making civil society in Egypt even bigger with one 
goal in mind: democracy. The social movements and civil society, especially in the 
case of Egypt, were depended on each other for the uprisings to succeed. Civil 
society was more dominant then that of SM’s due to amount of people however, is 
was the SM`s which initiated and planned the protests. “Egypt's 2011 revolt had 
coalesced around a group of about 15 young political activists who represented a 
broad swath of political ideologies…they were instrumental in plotting the 
demonstrations that unravelled the regime…uniting Islamists and secularists…led to 
the ouster of Mr. Murbarak…” (Levinson and Bradley, 2012).    
 
One of the key aspects of the 2011 protests was the unity, common goals and lack of 
fear within these social movements and the reason for their victory. This thesis 
argues that the many restrictions imposed by the government such as the 6 o’clock 
curfew, shut down of the Internet etc., was the cause for even more revolted in Egypt 
for civil society. The government became even more desperate and more violent but 
so did the protesters. This is evident in the documentary The Arab Awakening the 
End of a Dictator (2011) where young demonstrates such as Miral Brinjy who argues 
that in the beginning it was about the amount of people but when unprovoked 
methods such as the deprivation of Internet it became a violation of personal freedom 
and this inspired even more people to join (The End of a Dictator, 2011). Another 
significant factor which contributed to the massive protests was according to Mark 
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Lynch who argues in his famous book The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished 
Revolutions of the New Middle East (2011) that “…for changing Egyptian minds 
about participation in protests…[was] Khaled Said, a young man dragged from an 
Internet café…and beaten to death by police…After the young Alexandrian died 
from horrific police abuse, a group…created the Facebook page “We Are All Khaled 
Said” to organize protests in his memory…” (Lynch, 2011: 86). This is very 
significant for uprising as the sacrifice of this young Egyptian helped form civil 
society as many felt this could be their own son or husband, due to this drastic choice 
the people could now identify themselves with the opposition. Moreover, the death 
of Said assisted in breaking down the fear barrier and it can be argued that many felt 
that if he was willing to die for this cause so were they and therefore, they became 
part of civil society and SM`s. The revolution became more and more personal as 
discussed with Brinjy. The further events that occurred and the additional measure 
taken by the government to end protests only encouraged the people of Egypt further 
to join hands. 
 
Relative Deprivation Theory, as discussed in chapter one, is relevant in explaining 
the revolt in Egypt. It was argued that RDT is used in situations where people feel 
that their right to certain goods and conditions is banded and that this creates 
motivation to change this. The youth who initiated this were well educated both in 
Egypt and the rest of the world and had therefore, seen and been educated on 
alternatives ways of regimes such as democracy where the people had freedom and 
rights. It can be argued that this created a sense of deprivation as in other countries 
people had freedom and did not fear their state and Egyptians felt that they deserved 
this as well. Furthermore, globalization and technology such as the Internet also 
assisted in creating this sense of deprivation as the Internet and foreign media would 
criticize regimes such as Mubarak’s and influence these young people even further 
by showing alternatives and ways to change this. Even though, the youth felt 
deprived so did the rest of the people all suffering under the Emergency law which 
had existed since 1967 and  “The statutes that make up emergency law forbade most 
public gatherings, effectively criminalising protests, and allowed security officers to 
search and arrest anyone without probable cause. They also provided for indefinite 
 30 
detention and rendered judicial review ineffective.” (Al Jazeera, 2012). For so many 
years the people had been suffering under this law and felt deprived of their basic 
human rights and therefore, they found motivation from globalization, media and 
education and formed civil society and SM`s to end this deprivation. With the help of 
each other they became a unit that would have the power to end this totalitarian 
regime. Moreover, as discussed in chapter one civil society in cultures with 
totalitarian states has a hard time surviving and are often very secretive but of the 
utmost importance as in Egypt to end this form of government. The only reason civil 
society and SM`s in Egypt are so open and public is due to the fear barrier being 
removed. 
 
18 days of extremely broadcasted protests beginning on the 25th January 2011 in 
Tahrir Square ended when President Mubarak renounced his presidency on 11th 
February 2011 and the Supreme Counsel of the Armed Forces (SCAF) took power of 
Egypt. For many this did not change the situation, as many feared that their wish for 
democracy and more freedom became even more doubtful then during Mubarak’s 
period. This hypothesis believes that the concern of the people is in its place, as the 
SCAF was not democratically elected but also due to the fact that these generals 
derived from the previous regime, which was the main reason for the Arab Uprising 
in Egypt. Hamza Hendawi argues in his article Egypt’s Arab Spring: A revolution 
Gone Astray (2011) that “The military has solidified its hold, giving itself 
overwhelming powers while governance of the country has faltered, leaving 
Egyptians worried about turmoil in the streets and a faltering economy.” (Hendawi, 
2011). This is essential; as Egypt could not undertake a democratic path with the 
SCAF in power and this could very easily lead to further protests where the military 
would have to use violent force to stay in power and even more would be killed or 
injured or that the people would once more be repressed. Nevertheless, it is 
significant to mention that many supported the military in taking power after the 
resignation of the former president but it can be argued that they had not seen the 
consequences of this as they were blinded by happiness due to the end of an era of 
Mubarak. Mouin Rabbani argues in the The Arab Revolts (2011) that the people in 
the Arab world have been inspired by neo-liberal reforms and that radical change can 
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only occur if the old regime is being transformed. (Rabbani, 2011: 10-11).  Civil 
society in Egypt was inspired by Tunisia and the democracies of the Western world 
like Rabbani is arguing however, he also believes that these liberal visions only can 
be applied if the regime is being transformed and this is to some extent right. 
However, the old regime cannot only be transformed but has to be removed 
completely otherwise, there would always be traces of a totalitarian character such as 
with the SCAF being in power.  Furthermore, the Egyptian civil society demanded 
free elections not history repeating itself such as with both Anwar Sadat (1918-1981) 
taking over the presidency after Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918-1970) and Mubarak 
automatically succeeding Sadat without any democratically elections.  
 
The Society of the Muslim Brothers (MB) was founded in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna 
as a social movement as a response to the British occupation and has played an 
essential part in Egyptian history since. In 1952 they supported the military coup 
created by Nasser during the Egyptian Revolution to facilitate their ideology and 
aims however, they did not support the constitution to transform Egypt into a 
republic and this had grave consequences as their organisation became illegalised. 
Many members including famous Sayyid Qutb (1906-19966) were prisoned, tortured 
and killed. Jayshree Bajoria argues in the article Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood (2012) 
“The Brotherhood's original mission was to Islamize society through the promotion 
of Islamic law, values, and morals. An Islamic revivalist movement from its early 
days, it has combined religion, political activism, and social welfare in its work. It 
adopted slogans such as "Islam is the solution"…” (Bajoria, 2012). It is arguably to 
say that the MB was and is a social movement as it was established as a response to 
social change but Egypt was and is also a fragile state where social movements are 
needed and in states like this often in secret which the MB became. Furthermore, in 
chapter one it was argued that SM’s try to impact power holders and indicate their 
criticisms. The MB did this through political activism as in the case of the Egyptian 
Revolution and in 1984 and 1987 where they participated in the elections through 
other parties as they were still considered illegal. SM’s also arguable in chapter one 
attempt to show their goals to the general public in order to gain more members and 
support and this is true especially as through their social welfare work which attracts 
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many from the poor lower classes. RMT very much describes the MB as well and it 
is argued in this thesis, SM’s to be rational and organized. Individual criticisms are 
universal but social movements such as the MB arguing, "Islam is the solution", not 
everyone believes this therefore, there must be an organized development where 
collective disapproval converts into SM`s as with the MB throughout the past 30 
years with their religious belief. During the 2011 uprisings the organization played a 
vital role as Souad Mekhennet and Nicholas Kulish argues in their article With the 
Muslim Brotherhood Set to Join Egypt’s Protests, Religion´s Role May Grow (2011) 
“…the largest organized opposition group in the country, announced…that it would 
take part in the protest. The support of the Brotherhood could well change the 
calculus on the streets, tipping the numbers in favour of the protesters and away from 
the police, lending new strength to the demonstrations and further 
imperilling…Mubarak’s reign of nearly three decades.” (Mekhennet and Kulish, 
2011). Today the MB is a very large organization with many members and according 
to this assignment the movement is able to attract many people as it is based on Islam 
and resides in Muslim countries which easily can be combined compared to a 
country based on a diverse religion however, also through their wish for democracy 
and welfare work in the lower classes. In fact it has proved to be so popular that it 
formed its own party called the Freedom of Justice Party (2011) and has put forward 
a presidential candidate: Mohamed Morsi Isa El-Ayyat (1951). 
2.3 Libya 
In 1969 the Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi (1942-2011) took the power over his 
country and elaborated a new socialist political system, Jamahiriya, which can be 
translated as State of the Masses. Under the new rule civil society forces were 
excluded from the political power, which was centralized around Gaddafis 
"sultanistic" rule (Bhadwaj 2012: 82) (Prashad 2012: 109). The original idea behind 
Jamahiriya was based on citizens’ active participation on decision-making. It was 
suppose to be an example of 'direct democracy'. All Libyans were envisioned to take 
part in the decision making locally, through people's congresses and popular 
committees, but in reality, this was not the case. Majority of the people felt they did 
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not have any impact on the political decisions made and only a small minority 
attended the congress meetings regularly. (Joffé, 2011: 251-252.) Gaddafi’s son, Saif 
al-Isalm (1972), gave a very descriptive speech in 2009 where he stated that "In 
theory, Libya is the most democratic state in the world." where the emphasis was on 
the word theory. (Prashad 2012: 110.)  
 
The original idea behind the Jamahirya system would have been considerably more 
efficient than in democratic societies with elections and campaigns, but in reality, 
Jamahiriya did not leave any space for independent social or political action (West, 
2011: 300) (Joffé, 2011: 514). Private ownership, free press and retail trade were 
outlawed but in Tunisia and Egypt, the civil community flourished. Moreover, in 
Libya there were predominantly non-existing political alliances, networks of 
economic associations and national organizations, as these had not had the possibility 
to function under Gaddafi’s rule. The functioning possibilities of civil society in 
Libya had been restricted for many years and there were no space for social 
movements either. In the 1990's there had been a radical Islamist movement called 
the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group opposing the regime but the movement was 
abolished and members ended up in prison (Joffé, 2011: 522). During the revolution 
in 1969 the Libyan people supported Gaddafi and they probably would have in 2011, 
if he had kept his promises (Prashad, 2012: 105). Another important fact about 
Libyan society is the tribal variety within the population and the strict divisions 
between territories and cities. For example the capital Tripoli had been significantly 
more pro Gaddafi than the city of Benghazi (Joffé, 2012: 522) (Bhardwa, 2012: 82-
83). This is why Libya has been described as grand desert with two towns on both 
ends and sand between them (Prashad, 2012: 106). 
 
On February 17th 2011 peaceful demonstration was held in the Libyan town of 
Benghazi (Lynch, 2012: 167). The demonstrators demanded democratic reforms in 
Libya and protested against human right abuses and political corruption and they 
wanted to permanently end Gaddafi's rule. (Lynch 2012: 167) (Bhardwaj 2012: 81). 
The demonstration would have not been as massive, if Gaddafi’s regime had not 
arrested citizens two days earlier and these arrests gave an excellent advertisement 
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channel for the protesters. (Prashad, 2012: 95). This supports the resource 
mobilization theory, which emphasizes the importance of communication as a 
channel of informing and gathering social movements. Gaddafi ordered the military 
groups to stop the demonstration with violence, despite the vicious brutality from the 
troops, the protest quickly spread. During the first week of protesting regime forces 
slaughtered hundreds of people and these deaths were published in the social media 
and on Al-Jazeera TV-channel. The brutal images had a strong impact on the citizens 
and even those who previously experienced the brutality of Gaddafi, were mortified 
and he himself had sworn, that "there will be no mercy" (Lynch, 2012: 168-169).  
 
The Libyan protests occurred right after the collapse of Ben Ali and Mubarak's 
regimes in Tunisia and Egypt. This timing gave the protesters self-confidence and 
Arabs in the whole region saw Gaddafi’s violence as an offense against them and 
therefore, protesters gained huge support. The common feeling was that if Gaddafi’s 
repression and violence against his own citizens had turned out to be successful, it 
could have encouraged other Arab regimes to follow his example. However, on the 
other hand, if the protests had turned out to be prosperous, it would have inspired 
other Arab protests aiming for democracy. Two days later after the protests began, 
Gaddafi’s son Saif al-Islam announced the situation in Libya was not comparable 
with Tunisia and Egypt and that is why Libyans should not follow these examples. 
Furthermore, he accused television channels and Facebook of misinforming the 
citizens of what was proceeding. According to him other groups originally caused 
the violence, not his fathers regime. His speech ended up causing immense 
demonstrations, which were confronted with more brutal violence. At this point 
Marc Lynch indicates that the conflict turned into a civil war and events started to 
move hasty and develop fast. On 21st February 2011 Al-Jazeera’s Islamist face Yusuf 
al-Qarawi urged someone to lynch Gaddafi in order to end the country's despair. 
(Lynch, 2012: 167-169). 
 
Access to Internet information and television channels was blocked by the state and 
they hoped the protests would settle down. Among the people this generated a 
feeling of anxiety and uneasiness and the protesters had the town of Benghazi under 
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their authority which is significant as the city for a long time been the centre of 
Gaddafi's opposition (Lynch 2012: 169). On February 27th 2011 the National 
Transitional Council (NTC) was formed by groups who opposed Gaddafi (Bhardwaj, 
2012: 81). Benghazi had become the symbol of a new Libya and while Gaddafi's 
troops had material superiority over the rebels, he had also taken power in many 
cities as they approached Benghazi. The rebels announced that if no action by the 
international community were taken soon, the death rate of civilians could get 
tremendously higher. However, gained victories gave the rebels self-confidence and 
certain protesters were against a foreign intervention. For example the human rights 
campaigner, Abdul Hafiz Ghoga, stated in Benghazi that the rebels are strongly 
against the intervention and he wished Libya to be liberated by the Libyan people. 
(Prashad, 2012: 96-97.)  The no-fly zone was taken in use and on 18th March 2011 
the UN Security Council authorized the use of "…all necessary means in order to 
stop the killing" (Lynch, 2012: 169-172). The intention behind this initiative was to 
protect the civilians from violence and harm. The intervention by NATO under the 
approval of the Security Council and approved by the Arab League made sure the 
protesters and rebels were supplied with military weapons (Bhardwaj, 2012, 83-84). 
Later on the involvement of international society received criticism and suspicions of 
its motives (Lynch, 2012: 172). However, the Arab activists were content with the 
intervention, which was seen as a sign of support from the West. The anti Gaddafi 
forces formed NTC, which can be seen as a temporal “alternative government” for 
the Gaddafi regime. NTC were recognized by several other nations and many 
Libyans switched from Gaddafi's to the rebel’s side. In August 2011 the Gaddafi 
regime collapsed and in October 2011 Muammar Gaddafi was captured and killed. 
(Lynch, 2012: 176.)    
 
NTC can be seen as a successful social movement because it was able to take over 
the power from Gaddafi and get recognition from foreign states. This required the 
NTC had to have a wide support among all the anti Gaddafi oppositions. As 
discussed previously Libya has strict traditional tribal distinctions, which properly 
have made NTC's goal to sell their objectives widely in the public more challenging. 
It was also seen necessary to gain support from Gaddafi's side, which occurred 
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several times. According to the president of the American University in Cairo, Lisa 
Anderson, "Libya under Qaddafi has borne traces of the Italian fascism that ruled the 
country in its colonial days:  extravagance, dogmatism, and brutality." (Anderson, 
2011:6). It can be argues that the uprisings in Libya lead to an international 
recognized civil war. The ethnic, tribal and religious tensions were forgotten when 
the people rose together against the oppressive regime (Bhardwaj, 2012: 77). George 
Joffé (2012) claims that changing the political system in Libya, which was based on 
full autocracy, could only result into civil war. He further, believes that local activists 
did not have the required resources and socio-political infrastructure to challenge the 
regime with effective social movements and therefore, the violent conflict was 
inevitable (Joffé, 2012: 508-511).  These factors explain greatly, why in Libya it was 
not possible to have a successful uprising without violence involved as the citizens 
were not used to be part of the decision making process nor express their grievances 
freely. They did not have organizations or associations, which could have impacted 
the collective life, which supports Joffé's argument. A well functioning civil society 
in Western terms requires information and knowledge on how to express 
dissatisfaction effectively and get attention to objectives. The rebels might not have 
known many ways to get attention to their objectives except going to the streets and 
protest powerfully. On the other hand it can be asked as the opposing power was 
Gaddafi's regime, would the uprising had any possibility to be completed without 
any violence from both sides? What kind of other tools are there to make an uprising 
or revolution without violence? In the case of Libya, it can be argued that Gaddafi 
would not have given up power without a long a brutal fight. The social movements 
built by the rebel forces, impacted and got their aims attained by using violence 
because it was necessary in this particular situation.  
 
For Arabs worldwide the situation in Libya was a significant part of their own battle 
for democracy. Al-Jazeera provided the people a possibility to follow the conflict 
closely and without censorship, which made it feel as a personal fight to many. The 
news from Libya made the main headlines on TV-channels around the globe and a 
great amount of information was available on social media sites as well. (Lynch, 
2012: 173.) Resource mobilization theory can be applied here as the online social 
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networks and media information was a significant resource for organizing the anti 
Gaddafi demonstrations and protests. In a society where the public sphere is widely 
controlled by the regime interaction in grass root level becomes an important tool for 
the building of social movements. RMT further suggests that the social movements 
in Libya due to the Arab spring were built because of the mutual feeling of grievance. 
The Libyans were not satisfied with their leader and societal life and the brutal 
violence by the regime forces started the final countdown for the current regime. 
Common appeals were the base of the rebel groups, which in the end became a 
functioning social movement. However, it can be questioned whether these anti 
government movements were as successful as the ones in Tunisia and Egypt since 
the uprising was completed without a civil war and violence in the same scale as in 
Libya. The role of Islam was not as significant in the Libyan uprising as in the 
neighbouring countries and Gaddafi did not tolerate independent religious 
movements in the society. Still, there were various Muslim groups who were not 
officially organized and who were not literally Islamists (Cannistraro, 2011: 36). 
This lack in religious action made it more challenging for the Libyans to organize 
themselves effectively.  
The political process model takes in consideration on how the societies political 
climate affects the birth of social movements as discussed previously. This can be 
seen as an essentially important factor in Libya's case since under Gaddafi’s rule 
political action was extremely restricted. This might be an important aspect of why 
the Libyan uprising did not occur without wide violence as citizens felt their 
possibilities of making a change or having a strong impact were not adequate without 
taking up arms. After living several decades in a totalitarian society the oppression 
had to have an end at some point since the spreading of democratic values and 
freedom in the Arab world this can further, be seen as a goal for the West. RDT can 
also be effectively elaborated in the Libyan case since the grievances that launched 
the social movements were felt collectively. Comparisons were made between the 
situation in Libya and the ones in Egypt and Tunisia and this caused deprivation in 
the minds of Libyans. It can be asked, why did the Libyan uprising occur in spring 
2011 and was Libya only one part of the domino effect that spread through the 
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Middle East and North Africa?  The Libyan rebels received self-confidence from the 
occurrences in the neighbouring countries.   
 
The NATO intervention provided the rebels with weapons and other military 
resources, which helped them greatly in their fight against tregime troops. The 
political process model can be applied since the NATO intervention gave vital 
external resources to the social movements formed by the rebels, which gave them 
more opportunities to act successfully. The intervention moreover, gave further 
publicity to the rebels, which might have made it easier for them to attract new 
members. It can be argues that there was basically no civil society in Libya because 
of the policy practiced by Gaddafi. The Libyans still needed some sort of social 
frame to relate to like some type of group of which they felt to be part of. The tribal 
division might have been an alternative way of having "social movements" in Libya 
during Gaddafi's time. When the uprising began, it united the members from 
different tribes to join the fight against the oppressive regime. The tribal connections 
could have worked as a channel or pathway in recruiting new members for the rebel 
forces and as a way to unite and inform the citizens of what was happening. This 
tribal action can also be seen as a part of political process model since it created 
some “field” fof political action to occur in Libya where civil society was 
predominantly non-existing. Still the protesters were successful in organizing 
themselves due to the strong and psychological deprivation felling. The example set 
by the protesters in Egypt and Tunisia gave them self-confidence and the publicity 
and media attention worked as powerful tools, which lead to the foreign intervention 
and the final end of Gaddafi's era.  
2.4 Syria 
 
The conflict in Syria is largely influenced by Syria's history. The history of modern 
day Syria is riddled with foreign control and military coups. It is this history that 
allowed for the set up of the Ba'athist regime under the leadership of the al-Assad 
family. To gain an understanding of the current conflict it is essential to firstly take a 
look at the history leading up to the current conflict. 
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Syria was for four centuries part of the Ottoman Empire until 1916. At that point the 
Arabs used the opportunity of World War I to revolt with the aid of the British 
military. While Britain had promised the Arab countries full independence, under the 
Sykes-Picot agreement France and Britain divided the Middle East between them 
leaving Syria under French control. Syrians rebelled and in 1936 Syria was given 
partial independence. During World War II there occurred military confrontations 
between French troops allied with the Germans, and Free French troops allied with 
the British. In 1941, the British army and its French allies occupied Syria and 
promised full independence after the war. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the French did not 
keep said promise. Syrians protested again and in 1946 Syria became fully 
independent. 
 
The period following independence and leading up to the establishment of the 
Ba'athist regime were marked by political instability. Several coups and conflicts 
occurred and Syria was under threat from the West due to improving Syrian-Soviet 
relations. It also suffered from conflicts with Syria culminating in the Six Days War 
in 1967. The Ba'ath Arab Socialist Party came to power in 1963, and finally in 1970 
Hafez al-Assad, the father of current president Bashar al-Assad, led the Correction 
movement that brought security and stability to Syria after years of political turmoil. 
(Syrian Embassy Washington, 2005). 
 
The Ba'ath regime under Hafez al-Assad reshaped what was then an unstable regime 
into a robust one through a “…'neo-patrimonial' strategy that concentrated power in a 
'presidential monarchy' buttressed by his faction of Alawi lieutenants commanding 
the heights of the army and security forces.” (Hinnebusch, 2012: 96-97). This regime 
was very durable but provoked resentment amongst the majority Sunni community 
due to the political domination of the Alawi minority. The Muslim Brotherhood in 
particular led several urban rebellions against said regime. Any revolt was brutally 
suppressed and had success in doing so because “…the army, Damascus and the 
rural constituency of the Ba'ath remained loyal.” (Hinnebusch, 2012: 96-97). The 
regime generated a permanent fiscal benefit supported by Arab Gulf states due to 
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Syria's status as a front line state towards Israel. It also received cheap arms from the 
Soviet Union. Under Hafez a project of economic liberalization was started which 
was further expanded under Bashar.  
 
In 2000, following Hafez's death, Bashar took over the presidency and proceeded to 
open the Syrian economy to the world market. He as well went ahead with adapting 
the country to globalization through for example, the introduction of the Internet. 
Ba'athist policy was abandoned in favour of a 'middle' way through expanding the 
private sector instead of privatizing the public sector. Slowly but surely Bashar 
worked to remove members of his father's regime and inserting his loyalists in the 
army and security forces. He appointed reforming technocrats into government and 
in 2005 the 'old guard' was fully swept from power. In doing this Bashar was free to 
install the reforms he wanted but inadvertently weakened his capacity to sustain his 
power over society (Hinnebusch, 2012: 99). 
 
In 2001, as Bashar took power, there was a build-up of intellectual forums through 
which Syrians discussed possibilities for reform. The common threads through these 
forums were the call for increased transparency and accountability from the regime, 
the respect of human rights, and the lifting of the emergency laws. There was 
especially a disagreement with the image presented internationally of Syria as the 
birthplace of civilization and focusing on the past. Many Syrians found that the 
reality did not fit with this image, especially due to actions from the regime. These 
voices became more and more vocal, releasing literature and making public 
statements, until the regime cracked down on dissenting voices and opinion in the 
autumn of 2001. These events would later become known as the “Damascus Spring,” 
a possible precursor to the current conflict (Ghadry, 2005). 
 
The reforms put in place by Bashar's regime became almost indistinguishable from 
neo-liberalism, favouring economic growth while neglecting equality. The public 
sector was increasingly privatized and labour laws were increasingly cast aside. Parts 
of the public sector were turned over to crony capitalists who exported their wealth 
rather than re-investing in Syria. In practice, the reformists “…focused on making 
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Syria a centre of banking, tourism and cross-regional trade.” (Hinnebusch, 2012: 
101-102). Unemployment increased as cheap imported goods flooded the Syrian 
market, and very little of the economic growth 'trickled down' to ordinary people. 
 
A combination of the rise of a new ruling class of crony capitalists and financial 
austerity programs further alienated the majority of Syrians. Bashar's regime was 
perceived by the people to be “…abandoning the poor for the sake of the rich.” 
(Hinnebusch, 2012: 101-102). It is from this background of oppression and lack of 
representation, which the uprisings in Syria spawned from. Combined with the 
events transpiring in Egypt and Tunisia, Syrians gained a new form of courage 
against a regime which they have been living in fear of for four decades, and a long 
turbulent political history prior to that. 
 
While there were smaller events in different areas in Syria, the first mass 
mobilizations occurred in Dar'a. Reinoud Leenders and Steven Heydemann (2012) 
argue that opportunity structures in Dar'a were especially conducive to early 
mobilization because “…paradoxically, no one expected it to start there…” due to 
the assumption that Dar'a was largely loyal to the Ba'ath regime (Leenders and 
Heydemann 2012: 142). Urban Syrians also perceived it as ‘backward, marginal, 
conservative, and isolated’ Both the regime and opposition activists set their sights 
on urban areas as hotbeds for mobilization along with the Kurdish areas in the 
northeast. Due to this, Dar'a was largely overlooked as a possible catalyst for 
mobilization in Syria.  
 
Regime violence and repression in the area further aided in the mobilization of the 
tribes in Syria. Leenders and Heydemaan state that “…all accounts of the events 
suggest a level of coercion in Dar'a in early 2011 that was only to be seen elsewhere 
in the country much later in the uprising, including mass arrests, torture, the use of 
live rounds against crowds and targeted individuals suggesting a 'shoot-to-kill' policy, 
the deployment of snipers on rooftops and the prevention of medical treatment for 
the injured.” (Leenders and Heydemaan, 2012:143). The reason why the increased 
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violence had the opposite effect than intended (increasing protest and defiance) may 
perhaps lie in the clan values of the area. With strong values of justice, honour, and 
dignity the increasingly violent methods employed by the regime in Dar'a was 
perceived as adding insult to injury (Leenders and Heydemann, 2012:148). With 
increasing regime violence adding further insult to these values it becomes much 
more difficult for individual members of the clan to sit idly by without risking being 
marked as a traitor to the clan. 
 
The networks existing in areas like Dar'a aided as well in the organization and 
mobilization of the protests and dissent against the al-Assad regime. Firstly, the area 
has a high amount of migrant workers. The outbound migration is often organized 
through social networks based on factors such as clan membership and city/village of 
origin. The important part of this process is that due to the social networks involved 
in gaining contact with prospective employers and shelter/housing left many of these 
workers spending large parts of their lives living abroad with other Dar'awis. Second 
comes the cross-border traffic and linkages between Dar'a and Jordan. Much of 
Dar'a's social and economic life is directed towards Jordan, with strong clan/family 
ties existing between the border regions. Agricultural produce from Dar'a is moved 
to Jordanian cities close to the borders. There is as well a busy traffic of people 
across the borders. As Leenders and Heydemann state “…all these various, highly 
mobile economic activities, legal and illegal, are organized via elaborate trust-based 
networks linking family or clan members, major traders, money exchangers, 
smugglers, truck drivers, taxi drivers and unregistered drivers, and indeed corrupt 
customs officials.” They further states that there is a high crime level existing in the 
region. The criminal networks required to sustain such activity means that there is an 
already existing network required to sustain activity, which the regime regards as 
criminal. (Leenders and Heydemann, 2012:145). All of these networks point to the 
region being very inter-connected and these connections could well have been the 
necessary element for the mass mobilization seen in Dar'a and similar areas. 
 
It is as well interesting to note that in areas such as Dar'a there was a notable lack of 
individual key figures in the mobilization. Instead, the social networks and their 
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inter-connectedness replaced the role usually taken by individual movement leaders. 
For example there are references to neighbourhood committees, which often formed 
spontaneously. The demographics of the committees are described thusly: Some 
members were poor, others were quite well off, some were unemployed, and others 
ran their own businesses. Their ages varied from twenty-six to forty-eight years. 
They came from most of Dar’a’s main clans. Some had relatives abroad, mostly in 
the Gulf. Most had spent time in prison, but none for serious crimes. Together they 
bundled their resources, skills and connections, and initially began negotiating with 
the security forces to stop the bloodletting. Failing this, they provided protection and 
intelligence to the protestors, and encouraged army soldiers to defect. Relentless 
regime violence did the rest: “There was an unprecedented togetherness and each 
person felt like he knew the others for years. The authorities’ transgression actually 
made the bond between them much firmer.” (Leenders and Heydemann, 2012: 153). 
 
This description shows that these committees were able to organize themselves 
effectively in what seems to be a fairly non-hierarchical structure. Instead of leaders 
stepping forth to organize movements, people collectively pooled their resources 
together in hopes of organizing the mass protests, which occurred. This template 
spread out over the entire region and eventually leads to every village and town 
having its own committee. These committees then worked together and 
communicated, again using the already existing social networks as a basis for co-
operation (Leenders and Heydemann, 2012: 154). 
 
Similar features are exhibited in other regions, which mobilized in the early moments 
of the uprising. The existing informal social networks and the tribal values allowed 
for these regions to become an unlikely fuse for the mass protests, which occurred. 
The regime violence as well served only to strengthen the resolve of these regions as 
the strong sense of honour and justice existing amongst the tribes and clans aided in 
people perceiving regime violence not as a frightening deterrent but as an insult that 
must be fought against. The inter-connectedness of the regions meant that there 
already existed informal networks, which at the same time were embedded in life of 
the region but difficult for outside actors to understand or undermine. Collectively, 
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these factors allowed for these perceptively unlikely regions to become the catalyst 
for the events to come. 
 
One of the main problems with giving support to the Syrian opposition is that it has 
been difficult to put a unified face to the uprising. These come in part from the way 
the uprisings have been organized without any formal leadership. In October 2011, 
the Syrian National Council (SNC) was formed by a group of mostly exiled Syrian 
dissidents; this was an attempt to organize the different opposition groups and to 
perform as a functioning opposition government. There has however been a large 
amount of infighting, and while Western allies have recognized it as a legitimate 
representative, many are wary due to the volatile nature of the SNC and the deep 
divide between some of the groups therein (O'Bagy,2012:9). At the same time, 
grassroots protest movements in Syria remain largely ignored, leading as well to a 
feeling amongst some of the protesters that those who try to push themselves 
forwards as leaders are only “imposing their leadership on a popular uprising that 
had commenced and spread without them.” (Leenders and Heydemann, 2012:) Page 
 
Many of the SNC’s members are well-known opposition figures both in the 
Damascus Spring and earlier political activity in the 1980’s, which gave the SNC 
some credibility when it began. They hold forth that they will not negotiate with the 
current regime. They are made up of members the Damascus Declaration, the 
Muslim Brotherhoods, National Figures/National Bloc, the Kurdish Bloc, the 
Assyrian Democratic Organization, independent figures, and members of the Local 
Coordinating Committees. The make-up of the current SNC differs largely from its 
original charter, leading to accusations of restructuring to favour certain groups 
above others. The divisions within the SNC have increased frustrations both by 
foreign partners and the grassroots organizations on the ground (O'Bagy 2012: 10-
14). 
 
The Muslim Brotherhood has gained a large amount of control over the SNC. Having 
been effectively exiled since the 1980s, the long disconnect with Syria has made 
many Syrians wary of the Brotherhood. At the same time, there is a perception that 
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the Muslim Brotherhood has effectively taken over the SNC. This has led to worries 
amongst the populace that the Brotherhood may be trying to take over the revolution. 
Armed opposition leaders as well accuse the SNC of being a front for the 
Brotherhood, leading to leaders not wanting to cooperate with the SNC (O'Bagy 
2012: 15-16). 
 
Another widely recognized opposition organization is the National Coordination 
Committee (NCC) based in Damascus. It is a coalition of different opposition groups 
and is the only opposition organization to advocate dialogue with the regime. This 
has led to its position as being recognized by the Syrian government due to the 
moderate views. This has however alienated some groups, especially with the 
increased violence from Assad's regime. This has lead to an accusation of the NCC 
being a puppet organization controlled by the regime. There is again a divide here 
behind the formal organization and the more loosely organized grassroots 
movements (O'Bagy, 2012: 18-19). 
 
Another significant actor is the Free Syrian Army (FSA). Colonel Riad Asaad and 
six other Syrian army officers formed it out of a refugee camp in Turkey. The FSA 
portrays an image of having control over forces on the ground, where the reality is 
that it has not the power to do so. Instead, there is evidence to show that insurgency 
groups throughout Syria have voluntarily aligned themselves with the FSA as to give 
a more unified image to the armed opposition. While the FSA may not have as much 
control over ground forces as they say they do, the fact remains that some of Syria's 
most effective militias maintain direct ties to the Free Syrian Army. Instead of 
functioning as a formal military chain of command it operates much more like an 
umbrella organization (Holliday, 2012). These opposition groups all have different 
conflicts within and conflicts of legitimacy. The SNC and NCC are both accused of 
being puppets, whether for the regime or for the Assad regime. The FSA has 
maintained a level of legitimacy amongst ground forces maybe because of its 
apparently decentralized organization. It remains to be seen which organization 
would assume control in the case of the downfall of Assad's regime, but it remains 
clear that any organization will have to work to gain legitimacy amongst the grass 
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root organizations, which have emerged. It is perhaps they that hold the most 
influence over local legitimacy. 
 
The main factor in the Syrian conflict is perhaps that of economic woes along with 
the lack of political freedoms. With the election of Bashar al-Assad, the socialist 
programs set up by his father were quickly abandoned for favour of economic 
liberalization. However, this economic liberalization lead to money being 
concentrated only amongst a certain elite, and with the decline in employment in the 
public sector people saw them as being deprived not only in relation to the elite but 
also to how their lives were before. With many unemployed and facing the threat of 
homelessness, economic grievances were allowed to fester and the protective 
measures set up by Hafez al-Assad were weakened. This allowed for an opportune 
moment of uprising, which has continued until this day. While there is a lack of 
political legitimacy amongst many of the representative organisations such as the 
SNC and NCC, the grass-roots movements continue fighting and protesting on the 
ground and may yet bring forth a new Syria. 
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3. COMPARISON OF TUNISIA, EGYPT, LIBYA AND 
SYRIA 
3.1 Authoritarian States and Democracy 
 
A common feature of all four uprisings was the depression of authoritarian states 
where the people felt deprivation of freedom and human rights. For decades the four 
countries had lived without basic human rights such as the freedom of speech but 
also fear from their governments while they themselves had lived in wealth and 
power without taking care of their population. Mostafa Bassyouni argues in Labor 
Movement Absent in Syrian Revolt (2011) “…what they all had in common was the 
exclusion of the vast majority of their people from any say in the decisions that 
affected their lives. Even the most banal decisions made under these regimes were 
often devised to ensure their stability and power before the interest of the people.” 
(Bassyouni, 2011) Basshoyni is very reliable as any kind of democratic aspects did 
not exist in these four countries and every attempt to implement these was hit with an 
iron fist. These four countries were in theory democratic and claimed to be, but in 
practice there was huge democracy deficit. For example in Egypt, Syria and Tunisia 
there had only been one candidate running for president for decades and if any other 
would announce a candidacy they would be congested with sudden change of laws as 
in the case of Syria with president Bashar al-Assad (1965). However the case of 
Libya differs as there were no presidential elections and Gaddafi initiated his own 
political system: Jamahiriya. The people had for decades not been part of any 
decision-making even tough they became the effected ones such as with the rise in 
food prices, which made poverty rise further, even tough they were supposed to 
reside in a democratic state. The states ruled only in favour of the power and their 
fortune with no consideration of their populations and this argument is relevant for 
all four countries. Those who opposed were exposed to police brutality, torture and 
even death. Layla Al-Zubaidi and Joachim Paul argue that there was no existence of 
human rights – thousands were executed, imprisoned, exiled, and dissent silenced in 
many other ways (Al-Zubaidi and Paul 2011: 7). This had been the fear of most 
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people in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria and many even experienced it themselves. 
Throughout the past decades this fear barrier has been slowly broken by different 
riots and events in the states as people were suffering further which lead to the events 
of 2010/2011. Samuel P. Huntington (1993) has developed a theory of three waves 
of democratization. He states that a single wave often "involves liberalization of 
partial democratization in political systems that do not become fully democratic. " 
(Huntington 1993: 15). The first wave started in the 1800's and includes the 
democratization of the United States and many Western European countries. The 
second wave began right after WW2 and occurred in Eastern European and some 
Latin American countries. Third wave began in the 1970's and changed political 
systems to all the continents such the Soviet Union. (Huntington 1993: 16-23). It can 
be claimed the Arab uprisings might be the fourth wave of democratization since the 
uprisings were amongst others about people demanding democratic reforms but 
mostly social justice in in the same period in the Middle East and North Africa. 
Arguably the fourth wave is still on going as we can see for example in today's Syria. 
The governments have been in control of every aspect of state affairs and society 
however, this thesis argues that both in Tunisia and Egypt the governments were 
promoting the Internet to as wide audience as possible, but this backfired as new 
social media were an valuable feature of the uprisings. For example in Egypt the 
number of Internet users is 24,3% (Opennet Initiative, 2009D) of the population 
while in Tunisia the number as high as 34,1% (Opennet Initiative, 2009C). 
3.2 Social Media 
 
The background of the successful use of social media in organizing the protests is in 
the limited freedom afforded to the people by the ruling regimes. The rise of the new 
social media is contradictory as "it is often the government, aided by corporate 
interests, that promotes the new media thus inadvertently creating a space for civic 
activism." (Khondker, 2011:675). In Libya, Internet service was provided through 
the state-owned company Libya Telecom and Technology (Open Net Initiative, 
2009a). In Syria, “…the Internet was introduced to the general public in Syria in 
2000 as part of the modernizing reforms of President Bashar al-Assad.” (Open Net 
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Initiative, 2009b). In Tunisia, “…the government has energetically sought to spread 
Internet access” (Open Net Initiative, 2009c). Finally in Egypt, the government had 
ambitious programs set in place to improve the information and communications 
technology sector (Open Net Initiative, 2009d). These together allowed for the 
introduction of social media sites to the populace in these countries. As more and 
more people became accustomed to this new technology the regime grasp on the new 
media forms weakened. This new form for uprisings allowed activists for the first 
time to use a mainstream mass media for its purposes. Regime control was lessened 
due to the underestimation of the powerful tools afforded to the populace by the 
Internet and through social media sites. Considering for example in Libya, where 
civil society has been oppressed the connections afforded both through social media 
sites and through the mobile phone network may have provided some necessary 
organizational infrastructure which previously did not exist. It might have given 
different sects, tribes, clans, etc. and the chance to communicate and mobilize in a 
way that transcends social boundaries. 
 
Social media gave protest groups internationally the power to learn from and talk to 
one another. It allows for massive leaderless uprisings without many of the problems, 
which leaderless groups had before. In the past a leaderless movement might have a 
problem with coordinating and setting up protests without a centralized leadership. 
With social media they now had tools with which to organize on a level, which 
required only that people agree to show up to a protest on a certain date on Facebook. 
It can from their spread outside of the social media sites through word-of-mouth by 
those who have seen the event online. This also makes it increasingly difficult for 
regimes to oppress this form of protest due to a lack of a leadership with which to 
target. Here, it is not possible to just cut off the head of the movement as protests and 
dissent will still continue to function. The biggest problem with this form is seen in 
Syria where there is a certain lack of legitimacy for opposition forces due to there not 
being accepted leaders with which to present the opposition's views. It becomes more 
difficult to set up a politically viable opposition after-the-fact but it becomes an 
essential form in the beginning, as it is an effective tactic against oppressive regime 
control. 
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Through social media people see the violence and therefore more inclined to join the 
protestors. Blocked Internet access in Libya. Gaddafi's son blamed Facebook and 
Arab satellite TV channels for spreading lies (Lynch, 2012:169). Libya's massacres 
dominated Al-Jazeera’s screens and Arab social media sites for weeks increasing 
both domestic and international awareness (Lynch, 2012:173). In the case of 
Mohammed Bouazizi, there was apparently a similar case in Monastir before that did 
not have the same effect. This is because the images of Bouazizi were shared through 
social networking sites and therefore it allowed a faster spread of the incident. In 
2008, protest movements against the Tunisian regime were crushed without 
significant backlash due to low penetration by the new online media. In Egypt, 
information on the brutal death of Khaled Said at the hands of Egyptian police was 
posted online and spread throughout both local and international conscience 
(Khondker, 2011:677). Some states may have realized as well the usage of the new 
social media as a method of controlling information and spreading rumours that 
would favour the regimes.  
 
The new media aided in the mobilization of resources as awareness of the protests 
and demonstrations grew and support was gained through new allies and resources 
being brought in by those sympathetic to the activists. It creates as well a political 
opportunity that did not exist before which may well be one of the many reasons for 
the success of these uprisings which fits well with the political process model of 
social movement theory. As well this means that it broke up the monopoly of the 
regime to frame events as they saw fit. The added information as well coming in 
from the outside world may have created a view of relative deprivation due to 
comparisons with citizens of other nations. As is stated by Vincent Cannistraro 
(2011) “…the essentially leaderless protests in Tunisia and Egypt were afforded by 
the breakdown in government-controlled national opinion, made possible through a 
global technology available to almost everyone.” (Cannistraro, 2011: 36). 
 
The use of social media is an indicator that the uprisings were supported largely by 
the youth, and is an indicative factor in calling the uprisings a “youth revolution”. 
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The possible effect of social media was played down, or in some cases controlled 
through traditional methods (such as through physical intimidation by state forces 
inside of Internet cafés until later on when powers were used to shut down or control 
social media at which point government efforts were effectively too late. As an 
Egyptian activist put it, “…we use Facebook to schedule the protests, Twitter to 
coordinate, and YouTube to tell the world.” (Khondker, 2011: 677). Traditional 
media, such as Arab satellite television, had perhaps a larger impact, as they were the 
means to which the information shared through social media sites they were able to 
permeate mainstream knowledge. While the role of social media should not be 
overly emphasized as the main reasons for the uprisings were the pre-existing 
revolutionary conditions and the inability of the state to contain the revolutionary 
upsurge which evolved from that. Social media nonetheless had a crucial role as a 
tool in the mobilization of uprisings as well as the spread of information throughout 
the Middle East and North Africa.  
 
Hannah Arendt emphasized the role of publicity in well-functioning civil society. 
Within the states, which have been studied there have been differing levels of 
publicity opportunities for civil-society organizations, from the relatively open 
Tunisian society to the closed regime in Gaddafi's Libya. Social media therefore, 
gives an alternative for publicity, which circumvents any of the possible restrictions 
placed on the populace, by the state. It allows for the creation of a new form of social 
movement organizations that are at once effective and leaderless. It allows for people 
to publicly take part in civil-society while perhaps remaining more private than they 
would under conventional methods of communication. RMT features here as well, 
with social media being a great tool for the organization of people and resources. In 
these cases civil-society has in most cases been oppressed in some way and that may 
very well have increased the role of social media as a tool for mobilizing resources. 
Habermas' theory can as well be implemented here, as he requires an articulation of 
public interests in order for the state to work. Political parties and parliaments need 
to have access to the views of not just the majority but also that of marginalized 
groups, and social media is an effective way to do so, especially when there are 
restrictions being placed on the freedom of expression. One feature of modern civil 
 52 
society organizations is that they move themselves more to an online arena to reach a 
wider audience. We can see for example with the Occupy movement that their 
organization has taken place mainly online through social media sites and has 
through that created an effective social movement organization. In this way, social 
media can give civil society the power to shift towards democracy. Also, mentioning 
Occupy, we can add that social media has given an extra power to influence 
internationally, as the Occupy Wall Street movement was greatly influenced by the 
Arab uprisings (Skinner, 2011). We can therefore see through this the importance of 
social media as a tool for social movement organizations. 
3.3 Islamists Movements 
 
One of the main themes in these countries during the uprisings has been the rise of 
Islamist movements and it can be argued that these are rational. These organizations 
have existed since the 1920s but in the 1970s Islamists movement became more 
attractive as Islam had a revival in society such as in the case of the Iranian 
revolution in 1979. The Muslim Brotherhood has spread throughout the Middle East 
but its importance in Egypt has had more meaning than in Tunisia, Libya and Syria. 
Roel Meijer believes in his article Taking the Islamist Movement Seriously: Social 
Movement Theory and the Islamist Movement (2005) that “… taking the Islamist 
movement seriously and considering it a rational movement …  Rosefsly Wickhalm 
and others, like Salwa Ismail, argue convincingly that the programme of “civic 
obligation” that the Islamist movement upholds is in fact a hidden political agenda” 
(Meijer, 2005:288-289). According to this thesis the MB in Egypt has a political 
agenda and has had it since its emergence. For decades they have tried to reach their 
goals through different means especially during uprisings where they presented their 
presidential candidate. In the other three countries the MB has been of lesser 
importance as in the case of Tunisia it was considered as a bad influence by the 
government. The organization did not exist in Tunisia but it influenced the political 
party Ennahda with its ideology and political agenda. The case of Libya is very 
similar to the one of Egypt as the MB is very rational and organized movement as it 
for example has formed its own political party – the Justice and Development Party. 
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Furthermore the Egyptian MB had been exiled and prosecuted since Nasser took 
control of Egypt and so has the Libyan MB. “…the Brotherhood has had a presence 
in Libya since 1949, but that many of its leaders were jailed under Gaddafi or exiled” 
(Aljazeera, 2012). The MB in Syria became illegal in 1963 and it is a large 
organization however, it has not formed a political party. It can further be argued that 
the MB in Egypt, Libya and Syria is an Islamist group, which is well organized and 
have managed to mobilize. Meijer argues further, that many theorists believe that 
psychological and political strains assist in the rise of Islamists organization but that 
these do not explain its effective recruitment and organization and this thesis believes 
this to be true (Meijer, 2005: 280). In chapter one this assignment argues that in 
Muslim organizations they share the same faith and Islamist movements can 
therefore, attract new members’ interest through their social relationships. Moreover 
these movements exist in totalitarian regimes and offer a new ideology without 
brutality and repression and therefore they have this success. 
 
Cedric Dupont and Florence Passy argue in The Arab Spring or How to Explain 
those Revolutionary Episodes (2011) that “People need to develop a frame of 
indignation, a shared perceived identity with contenders as well as the sentiment that 
they could bring about social and political changes” (Dupont and Passy, 2011:449). 
This applies in the case of Middle East: in these four countries in particular. As 
discussed in chapter two the people of Egypt, Libya, Syria and Tunisia had been 
living with repression, brutality, lack of freedom and without welfare however, if 
inequality between the ruling elite and working class did not exist, the deprivation 
would be minor. It is clear that Islamist groups such as the MB is mobilized, well-
organized and have many members however, Quintan Wiktorowicz argues in Islamic 
Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach (2003) that RMT arose as a response 
to the lacking theories within SMT as they only focused on individuals with 
psychological deprivation. RMT as discussed in chapter one emphasis rationality and 
collective action (Wiktorowicz 2003, 9-10). This thesis considers him to be reliable 
in the case of the Middle East. Discussed previously the MB has managed to spread 
and influence in authoritarian states such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria and has 
gained much power and here SMT would not be sufficient as the MB is a rational 
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organization based on collective action. Even though their deprivation might be 
individual at first however, this is omnipresent but as soon as base a movements on it, 
it becomes collective. Moreover, in the four countries Islamist groups are very 
present and have much influence, which scares the governments. It was the shared 
identity discussed by Dupont and Passy, which make these organizations so powerful 
and feared. For now they have managed to take down three governments and 
convince international society to be on their side. This was done in states with 
restricted resources and lack of political freedom. 
3.4 Bread Riots 
 
In Egypt people chanted “They are eating pigeon and chicken, and we are eating 
beans all the time” (Prashad, 2012: 9) whereas in Libya a chant with a similar theme 
was “The richest country in the world and the poorest people in the world” (West, 
2011: 315). In Tunisia and Egypt there was a clear divide between the lives of the 
president and their relatives compared to the average citizen and in Syria there was a 
shift of politics from socialist egalitarianism to inequality and economic 
liberalization in favour of crony capitalists resulting in increased homelessness and 
higher unemployment. To add to this there was an inflation of food prices in 
particularly Tunisia and Egypt, which helped trigger grievances against the state, and 
the neo-liberal policies employed by some states. In Tunisia and Egypt a common 
feature occurred with the increase of food prices that sparked the famously bread 
riots. As discussed in chapter two the Egyptian bread riots occurred in 1977, 1985 
and 2008 while in Tunisia they took place in 1978 and 1984 with violent riots and 
many casualties and it can be argued that these lay the foundation in both countries 
to the 2011 uprisings. The states in both countries were attempting to liberalize the 
economy and here RDT can be applied as the people felt economic deprivation of 
basic necessities and therefore, protested to achieve these. “Ben Ali, who ruled the 
North African country with an iron fist for 23 years, grossly underestimated the 
public’s anger over being unable to put food on the table”. (McGrath, 2011) It was 
mostly the lower class and unemployed, which demonstrated, as they could not 
afford this. Compared to Tunisia and Egypt, Libya did not have the same problem 
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with food prices, but were more affected by the suppression of genuine democratic 
opportunities. 
3.5 Unemployment 
 
Jacob Kolster and Nono Matondo-Fundani argue in the foreword of Jobs, Justice and 
the Arab Spring: Inclusive Growth in North Africa (2012), that the revolutions had 
serious economic underpinnings: governments in the region had failed in creating 
jobs, especially for the young, and the economic policies which formed the basis for 
inclusive growth after independence had long-hence been unravelling (Kolster and 
Matando-Fundani, 2012:6). Due to financial crisis and fiscal deficit Egypt and 
Tunisia had a high rate of unemployment and therefore many well-educated young 
people who now were without jobs highly contributed to the uprisings. People, 
especially youth, get very rebellious without economic potentials. As educated 
people know how to organize themselves and as they also felt so much deprivation, 
therefore their fear was minimized. Furthermore, they managed to encourage the rest 
of the population of their countries to revolt as Khaled Said and Mohamed Bouzazi 
made the drastic choice to kill themselves in the name of democracy and basic 
human rights. Furthermore it can be argued whether these uprising were benefit for 
the unemployment issue. Tunisia and Egypt are both known as very attractive tourist 
destinations, however riots and protests decreased their popularity. According to 
Glen Carey and Vivian Salama’s article in Bloomberg BusinessWeek Egypt tourist 
arrivals from January to June 2011 dropped 39 per cent compared to the same period 
year before and Tunisia’s tourism revenue dropped 39 per cent during the first nine 
months of 2011 (Carey and Salama, 2011). As very many occupations in these 
countries are related to tourism therefore it can be argued that the lack of tourist after 
the uprisings did not create any new job opportunities. This thesis believe that what 
these countries need in order to heat up their economy is a manufacturing branch, 
which is based on science and can therefore use many high-educated people. As one 
of the reasons of economic weakness can be the deficiency of export articles, this 
manufacturing branch should also be able to face the competition in international 
market. The other weakness of this region’s economy is the complex bureaucracy 
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related to private enterprises. When state is foiling the development of private sector, 
it is clear sign of lack of self-implementation and freedom and this situation is very 
likely to lead to uprisings. In Syria, the economic restructuring of Bashar al-Assad 
created a situation where public jobs were cut in favour of privatization. The 
economy grew but only benefited a certain portion of the population, mainly crony 
capitalists. This did not create the necessary trickle-down which could have 
alleviated the pressures brought about by the lessening of employment in the public 
sector. With increasing unemployment and greater social inequality brought about 
through his economic reform, Bashar inadvertently set up the economic grievances, 
which would develop into the Syrian uprising. During his father's regime, the state 
provided a lot of employment opportunities but this was set aside in the name of 
economic liberalization and thus made social mobility more difficult. 
3.6 Labour Unions 
 
The labour unions played essential roles in both Egypt and Tunisia during the 2011 
uprisings due to their long history of organization and activity but also the high rate 
of unemployment of highly educated young people. In the case of Egypt the many 
relative new formed unions such as the April 6th youth movement from 2008 was 
created on the basis of the economy and the repressive state. These people knew how 
to organize themselves and felt so much deprivation that their fear was minimized. 
Furthermore, they managed to encourage the rest of the population of their countries 
to revolt as Khaled Said made the drastic choice to kill themselves in the name of 
democracy and basic human rights. In Tunisia the more long-standing Tunisian 
General Labour Union (UGTT) (1946) was an active participant in the 2011 
uprisings however, the history like in the case of Egypt also played an essential role. 
Chris Toensing argues in his article Tunisian Labour Leaders Reflect Upon Revolt 
(2011) believes that “…the 1970s, conflict erupted between the UGTT and the ruling 
party, the Neo-Destour…The federation refused to be controlled by the ruling 
party…Many union activists were jailed; others were dispersed, but continued their 
work in secret. In January of that year, the federation had called a general strike to 
protest the rising cost of living…” (Toensing, 2011) In Egypt the unions also 
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opposed against the regime due to the unfair conditions in the 1970s and 1980s as 
discussed previously with the bread riots. The violent and bloody past of unions in 
both Egypt and Tunisia laid the foundation for success in the 2011 uprisings, as they 
were organized and had no fear barrier. Moreover, the organizations had gained 
many members through out the past decades and had much experience and according 
to Toensing once the unions supported and joined the 2011 uprisings in Tunisia they 
regimes has little chance in surviving (Toensing, 2011).  However, this thesis argues 
that this description also match Egypt. In chapter one the political process model 
theory is discussed and can be applied to the labour unions. Meyer and Minkoff’s 
(2004) signal model fits the labour unions as the activists have been noticing changes 
in the political environment such as the economy, and have therefore, found 
encouragement for mobilization and for promoting policy reforms. Furthermore, this 
theory concentrates in the official opportunities for political action and the labour 
were an example of this. In comparison the uprisings in Syria did not consist of 
labour movements as “The labour movement is simply absent in Syria…Syrian 
unions are controlled by the state and have been relatively listless compared to those 
in Egypt and Tunisia…semi-independent Tunisian unions and an increasingly active 
Egyptian labour movement…helped catapult the organized workers into the heart of 
revolution. In both cases, this led to a quick resolution of the uprising in favour of the 
people ”(Bassyouni, 2011).  
3.7 Tribes 
 
In Libya and Syria the biggest importance (at least in the beginning in the case of 
Syria) was that of tribal connections. In Egypt, the tribes had little impact on the 
uprising but have a large influence on the outcomes of elections, especially in the 
South. In cases where there is little difference in candidates, “…the way to raise 
support has most often been through a reference to the tribal background of the 
candidate.” (The Danish Egyptian Dialogue Institute, 2012). Tribal associations did 
not have any significant effect in Tunisia. In Libya, Gaddafi had previously relied on 
tribal divisions to keep tribal influence down but under the revolution the tribal 
leaders were able to put aside their differences temporarily against Gaddafi. In Syria, 
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the tribal connections organized the first mass movements due to their traditionalist 
sense of justice and honour which gave them added resolve in fighting against the 
injustices performed against them by the regime. These connections help in 
mobilizing as if the tribe or tribal leaders decide to mobilize there is great incentive 
for individual members to join, as it is very difficult to go against the tribal will. It 
can be argued that the feeling of “unity” and loyalty felt towards the tribe, functioned 
as a incentive to join the protests with the rest of the tribe These tribal connections 
can be considered to be the civil society connections needed for the political 
mobilization in areas where there are no other civil society alternatives such as in the 
case of Libya. In Libya the tribal membership was considered to be as a “…kinship”. 
On the other hand, the strong tribalism was also one factor, why Gaddafi managed to 
stay in power for such a long period of time. He firmly counted on the support and 
reliance of his own tribe Qaghadhfa and a few other loyal tribes. (Prashad, 2012: 
112). However, in Syria it was less a case of the tribes being the only option but that 
they were not considered threats to the status-quo due to the perception of them as 
being simple and naïve farmers and were therefore not under the same watch and 
scrutiny by the regime as more urban settings. As well, the subdivisions of the tribes 
from tribes to clans and then finally to families helps create a connection wherein 
you have a similar sense of honour or justice for your tribe/clan as you do for your 
family. This was the case in Syria where the harsh regime crackdowns on protesters 
in the tribal areas created better solidarity and increased resolve amongst the activists 
as the regime crackdowns were seen as insults against the tribes. A similar effect 
may have been observed in Libya where the country is largely tribal where harsh 
responses from the government incited conflict and attracted larger popular support, 
widening protests into violent rejection of Gaddafi with no possibility of compromise 
(Bhardwaj, 2012:82). One might be able to draw the conclusion here that the same 
level of tribal solidarity existed within the two countries which allowed for the harsh 
regime response to not work as a deterrent as was intended but rather as a catalyst for 
revolutionary attitudes amongst the people. 
 
The lack of political opportunities in both Libya and rural parts of Syria has given 
that structurally any form of activism had to rely on the strongest network available, 
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which in these cases were the tribes. Because tribes weren't traditionally political or 
were thought of as being neutral, there was no valid reason to oppress them at the 
same level as civil-society organizations. As well the tribal associations are more 
difficult to oppress due to people investing so much of their identity into their 
heritage and tribal connections and loyalty are perhaps not as obvious as others. On 
the side of RMT, these tribal connections, especially in the case of Syria, allowed for 
mass resource mobilization away from the sights of the regime as they had been used 
to. The informal connections between tribes and clans allowed for mobilization in 
place of the formal connections that were available for example through the labour 
unions in Egypt and Tunisia. Therefore, one could put RMT as a key theory in 
explaining the importance of tribal connections in Libya and Syria. 
3.8 Outcome 
 
The outcomes have been mixed in the four countries studied here. In Egypt, the 
Muslim Brotherhood has taken over, but there are still protests over the control of the 
military. In Tunisia, the moderate Islamic party Ennahda won the popular vote with a 
new constitution that has been drafted and implemented. We see in these two 
countries the influence of Islam in the political arena following the uprisings, with 
the Islamic influence in Egypt being more volatile. In Libya, the knowledge of what 
democracy is misunderstood and therefore the implementation of such a system must 
wait (Prashad, 2012:243-244). It is also the clearest example of a revolution amongst 
these samples as both the government and military power were overthrown.  In Syria 
the conflict is on going and has developed into a full-scale civil war with little signs 
of a peaceful resolution in the near future. Women, poor people, and uneducated 
people had a large role in the uprisings. There is a certain level of solidarity, which 
has been built up by these uprisings in the Arab world. There has been a build-up of 
the idea of citizenship. There has as well been a release of political prisoners. A new 
constitution has been written in Tunisia. In Libya an assembly was put together to 
draft a new permanent constitution that will then be put for a referendum. The 
constitution has been suspended in Egypt and a new draft is going to be put before a 
vote December 15th. There are however on going protests against newly elected 
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President Mohamed Morsi, where “…the most common refrain was not about the 
constitution; it was a call for 'the fall of the regime.” (Kirkpatrick, 2012). Civil 
society has been given a new area for functioning, especially in Libya where civil 
society was repressed by Gaddafi's regime. For example in they have founded the 
Libyan Civil Society Organization, which is “…an alliance of Libyan individuals, 
serving as an independent, non-governmental promoter of social justice and equal 
opportunity.” (Libyan Civil Society Organization, 2011). This form of organization 
would not have been allowed to exist under the rule of Gaddafi. The biggest 
difference in outcomes is probably in Syria where the Assad regime still sits in 
power. This is due to the Assad's regime persistent fight against the opposition and 
the lack of international response where both Russia and China have used their veto 
power to suppress Security Council resolutions aimed at international intervention in 
Syria. As well the Assad family has prepared for dissent since the beginning of 
Hafez al-Assad's regime and there were therefore measures in place to fight dis sent 
despite Bashar's dismantling of some of these protections. The uprisings have spread 
their effects to over 15 countries in the Middle East and North Africa. 
 
After much debate it can be argued that the economic situation and lack of social 
justice were the main contributors of the Arab uprisings. For decades the populations 
of these four countries had been considered inferior in many aspects, however within 
the economy social injustice clearly prevailed. Financial decisions were made in 
favour of the upper class while the rest were suffering and poverty rose. The bread 
riots in 1977, 1978, 1984, 1985 and 2008 evidently show a pattern of disagreement. 
Furthermore the rise of labour unions and unemployment rate further indicates the 
injustice. According this thesis these are some of the most essential issues as they 
laid the foundation of the 2010/2011 uprisings. “…repression could not prevent 
popular mobilization from reappearing. New waves of protest and challenge from 
below would recur – economic protests in the early 1980s, serious pushes toward 
democracy in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and then a steadily gathering tidal wave 
of protest that rose over the entire decade of the 2000s” (Lynch, 2011:42). Another 
essential factor was the social media, however it can be argued that social media 
functioned as a tool. It had two functions: it gathered people and helped them to 
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organize the demonstrations, and secondly it generally raised the awareness what 
was happening and provided information, giving people free arena to share their 
thoughts and have a discussion. People providing information to people helped in 
circumventing the state’s monopoly on the creation of information and news. 
Conventional media sources therefore gained a new source for which to describe 
current events of the region. It can furthermore be argued, “This went beyond simple 
media attention. Arabs identified with each other across borders and saw their 
struggles as intimately and directly linked. When the Tunisian uprising began, 
history tells us that it was almost inevitable that it would spread across the region” 
(Lynch, 2011: 65). The role of the Islamist movements and the tribal division are 
also significant for the uprisings, however their roles were more essential in certain 
countries such as the MB in Egypt and the tribes in Syria. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
As a conclusion it can be said that civil society impacted on the uprisings mainly 
through social media and various social networks. Nevertheless in Libya the civil 
society did not have such a strong impact on the uprisings since it predominately 
non-existing. In this case civil society can be considered as a result of the uprisings. 
All of the countries studied in this thesis had naturally their own peculiar and unique 
grounding for the grievances to be formulated. However, several similarities can also 
be found. Originally free political discussion and gathering was not entirely possible 
in the societies examined. This caused deprivation in peoples minds: the deprivation 
was felt about social injustice, lack of democratic reforms, the standards of living 
and oppression practices by the regime. The access to Internet and use of informal 
networks enabled the uprisings to occur where confluences with RMT can be noticed. 
Also the Arab uprisings can be seen as a domino effect that started form Tunisia in 
2010. The Tunisian protesters set an example which gave courage and hope for their 
Arab neighbours to implement their own fight for the reforms.  
 
The civil society impacted on the uprisings through demonstrations and protest, 
which were possible to be organised in such a large scale by the use of social media 
and existing social connections, whether formal civil society connections as with 
labour unions in Tunisia and Egypt, or informal connections such as tribal networks 
in Libya and Syria. It was these connections, which allowed for the manifestation of 
the economic woes of the general populace. It is these woes, which were the 
fundamental element to these uprisings. In the countries where civil society was 
weak or repressed, it can be argued that the informal connections and networks 
stepped in to fill the same role, allowing for organization through forces outside of 
the state. This perhaps shows a lacking area in civil society theory as we can ask 
ourselves whether “uncivil society” such as criminal or tribal networks can be 
considered as a different form of civil society when talking about nations where the 
state exhibits either complete or partial control over traditional avenues of civil 
society. Since uprisings were partly about implementing democratic reforms, 
Alexander de Toqueville’s idea about civil societal associations can be seen as a 
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valid conception since the democratic action were practised and implemented among 
the protesters.   
 
The conflict in Syria in many ways echoes the same conditions and reasons for 
regime overthrow in the different states. It has however not yet reached the goal of 
the overthrow of Assad’s regime. This can be attributed to a variety of factors. First 
and foremost, there is the fact that Assad’s regime has been prepared for uprising 
since the beginning of Hafez al-Assad’s regime. Measures were put in place so that 
most of the military forces and political powers in Syria were loyal to the Assad 
family through political connections as well as ethnic connections through the large 
amount of the Alawi minority placed in high positions. While Bashar has weakened 
many of those measures by ousting those who were loyal to his father, the regime 
still remains very strong. While opposition forces remain strong in the countryside, 
the cities, specifically Damascus, have been able to remain as regime strongholds. 
The next issue involved is that of the effect of foreign interests in Syria. There have 
been calls for military intervention in Syria, but any security council resolution 
which aims to condemn the actions of the regime have been blocked by Russia and 
China, which comes especially from the fact that historically, Syria has been the 
Russian entry into the Middle-East. Support for both sides has been pouring in from 
outside of Syria’s borders, resulting in a fairly even stalemate as the situation is now. 
It looks however as if there is a shift in rhetoric in international politics, especially 
from the US with there being talks of worries of an al-Qaeda presence in Syria. So it 
may perhaps just be a matter of time before the Syrian conflict either becomes 
resolved on its own, or becomes an international conflict through foreign military 
intervention. 
 
It can be seen that it is possible to implement all the theories such as RMT, PPM and 
RDT in forming the social movements that were involved in the uprisings, however 
it is relevant to take into consideration the special characteristics of these societies 
since the theories were originally meant to be elaborated in Western societies. For 
example, there is a higher chance of violence being used within social movements in 
these nations due to the regime violence which was often used against the protesters 
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and often served not as a deterrent but as further justification for those opposing the 
ruling regimes. Western social movements often operate out of the assumption of 
non-violent practices whereas such a luxury cannot always be afforded in more 
volatile areas of the world.  
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